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Abstract 
The world is currently facing a number of large environmental challenges, and cleantech is 
pointed at to be one of the best potential answers. However, in the winds of a financial crisis, 
shifting capital markets and rapidly growing information technology sector, the cleantech 
segment currently finds itself in a disadvantaged situation where the direly needed early-stage 
capital is not finding its way to the cleantech start-up companies. Arising from the situation is 
a funding gap which governments increasingly try to react to by getting involved in venture 
capital funding. This study is is a response to a defined knowledge gap on how these public 
VC instruments should be set up in order to spur self-sustained investments in the early-
stage cleantech venture market. The author used the OECD guidelines for public venture 
capital as a framework and looked at four different international cases of public VC 
involvement and conducted a number of interviews with experts and stakeholders. The 
findings from the open ended interviews were coded and categorized into relevant topics. In 
the analysis the author combined the cases and the interview findings according to the 
OECD guideline criteria in order to look for best practices and obstacles in public VC 
instrument design. The study concludes that it is difficult to generalize public VC instrument 
design as there are many contextual factors involved. However, the study also concludes that 
the shift in the provision of private VC affects how these instruments should be designed. 
Further the study concludes that the stage of the cleantech venture chain to be targeted also 
affects public design incentives. Finally, the study implies that special attention should be 
given to additionality considerations and that there is a rather untapped scource of 
„knowledgeable private VC‟ seeking more than just direct investment profits. 
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Executive summary 
Cleantech, or cleaner technologies, are mentioned to be one of the major factors in shifting 
human activities on earth from perishable to sustainable. Cleantech is defined as technologies 
that have a higher benefit to the environment than already existing technologies. These can 
for instance be energy efficiency technologies, material reducing technologies, technologies 
that require less toxic chemicals, or renewable energy technologies to mention a few.  
One of the main drivers of new technology development, such as cleantech, is venture 
capital funding. This can be described as injections of capital into businesses that are 
developing or that have developed a new product, ensuring that the company has the money 
to further develop the product and to grow in the marketplace. In the last 4-5 years there has 
been a shift in who provides the venture capital to the young businesses, especially in the 
cleantech sector. Venture capital funding has been a function of private actors, investing 
money in not fully developed businesses in order to create rapid growth and make a profit by 
holding a nominal share of the company‟s equity. As mentioned, in the later years, there has 
been a shift where the private actors are becoming less and less active in the cleantech early 
stage segment which has left a funding gap. 
Figure 1.1 The innovation funnel and the equity gap of cleantech. (Sources: Canadian Funding Gap. 
SDTC, 2013) 
 
This funding gap of cleantech has led to a need for governments to step in and cover the 
previous private capital spendings with public money. Behind this lies the rationale that the 
gap is a result of a market flaw causing cleantech ventures to receive the short end of the 
stick while more established technologies, such as oil & gas and other common energy 
technologies are not affected to the same extent. The shift has also lead to governmental 
worries when it comes to the monetary distribution, or in other words; how to get the best 
„bang-for-the-buck‟ in terms of how governmental money should be spent to increase the 
number of new cleantech ventures.  
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In order to address this problem the author of this paper looked at 4 different cases of public 
venture capital funding, representing the UK, Norway, Germany and Finland. Further, 
interviews with representatives from the different public funding mechanisms were 
conducted, along with interviews with topic professionals and other stakeholders. Further, 
the study analyses the information given by the interviewees and the cases through the lens 
of 4 OECD guidelines for public venture capital funding in the high-tech sector, plus a 
criteria added by popular demand revolving around legal aspects.  
The cases showed different approaches to public funding of early-stage cleantech ventures, 
ranging from the large and broad equity funds to smaller and more narrowly focused grant 
programs. Interestingly, all cases tried, in one way or another, to encourage private capital 
coming in to the ventures alongside with public capital. All funding programs also 
emphasized the importance of sectorial knowledge and networks within the sector.  
The cases also show different ways of public intervention in the market, with particular focus 
on how they view their own additionality in terms of „only filling the gap‟.  
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, allowing the respondent to 
focus on what they thought was relevant and important. The answers revealed a broad 
consensus that the major problems for early-stage cleantech ventures were: 
- Long time to market 
- Lack of funding (especially long-term funding) 
- Negative history in regards to public interventions 
The availability of private capital showed to be a big issue, and the interviews claimed that: 
- Private capital is available, but in different ways than before 
- There has been a shift in the focus of private VC; going from early-stage to later 
stage 
- …but also that larger sums of capital is available outside of the Nordic countries 
A boundary for the early-stage cleantech ventures is to attract the available capital. On this 
note, the interviewees were asked how this could best be done. Their major claims were that: 
- It is hard to attract private capital in isolation 
- There is a need to overcome the distrust in public policies by the investors 
- Not all investors have monetary goals when they invest in cleantech 
- Match-funding has proved to be easier 
In addition to these claims, the interviewees also pointed out that organizational capabilities, 
such as having a big and professional network is very important. It was also mentioned that a 
funding model cannot be copied because of contextual differences between the countries, 
that time and a clear mandate is crucial when a programme is established because both time 
and maneuverability is needed when a programme seeks it‟s place in the market, and that the 
people working on the public side within these programmes should have experience with 
developing and exiting venture companies. 
Finally, it was noted that legal aspects could be limiting for the profit of public VC because 
additionality and state aid puts limitations to the amount being invested and the size of equity 
being owned by the public programme or venture company.  
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The analysis showed that design considerations are important in terms of what approach the 
public programmes or entities should use when trying to attract private capital. This shows 
especially for very early „due diligence‟ screening and for the size of the networks. Also, the 
analysis suggests that design should consider the context of the private capital available. An 
example is how industry in Germany has a tradition with venture funding, while industry in 
the Nordic countries does not. This suggests that these kinds of considerations are very 
important. 
The analysis also suggests that public funding should not be limited to one stage, as several 
interviewees noted that the entire „venture capital bridge‟ was linked together and that one 
part would not function without the other.  
Further, it suggests that the shift in private VC focus, from private venture companies to 
sector-knowledgeable industry leads to a more trusting investor market as private VC will 
carry more insights to what they are investing in than their successors; the general venture 
capitalist.  
The analysis also uncovers that additionality should be considered very carefully when 
designing the public VC instrument. This is because additionality can be limiting to the 
portrayed „success‟ of public VC, but also because it can be accounted for in various ways. 
More thorough thought should be given to what it means for public capital to be truly 
additional. 
Having private involvement in public VC programmes can be seen as important and difficult. 
Important because it allows for a result oriented focus of public capital, an difficult because 
the incentives for private actors managing public capital are not ideal for the cleantech 
segment. Because private management companies are given a numeration based on the size 
of the funds they attract, they are incentivized to attract as large funds as possible, and not 
adding development value to their portfolio companies.  
The study concludes that there is no „one way‟ or best practice when it comes to public VC 
instrument construction. However, the study does find that there are a number of different 
factors that influence how public VC instrument design should be set up, and a number of 
approaches that are suitable to remedy those factors First of all, the study concludes that in 
order to attract private capital it is necessary to know what kind of private capital the 
instrument is going to attract. The analysis show that the investment incentives for industrial 
VC and „normal‟  VC companies might differ because of different interests. The study also 
concludes that because there is a shift in the VC market where normal VC has fled the 
cleantech sector and industrial investors and business angels are getting more involved in the 
same sector, public VC instruments should respond to this by not only focusing on for 
instance fund profit  Other important conclusions and recommendations are: 
- Match-funding is looking most plausible in the current market 
- Attention should be paid to state-aid argumentation and to additionality 
- Public interventions in the form of VC funding in the cleantech segment should aim 
to decouple private and public VC, not make public VC a prerequisite for private 
capital.  
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1 Introduction 
“…Clean tech manufacturing is a great business opportunity and an essential element for getting onto a 
sustainable development path. But if Europe wants to get back into the race it needs new and ambitious goals 
to pull its clean tech manufacturing to new levels of performance, and to stay competitive in the 21st century 
economy” Jason Anderson, Head of Climate and Energy Policy WWF Europe 
The global environmental challenges of today are of a significant scale.  Our continuously 
increasing population and our quest to meet the needs of all adds a growing strain on our 
natural resources and natural environment. As a consequence we are facing major challenges 
such as depleting natural resources, food shortages, lack of clean water, soil degradation and 
toxification, and human impacts on the climate (UNEP 2013). As one of many important 
responses to these challenges, cleantech has been singled out to be a key element in 
overcoming these obstacles. Cleantech (also referred to as CT), can be defined as an activity 
which develop, produce or implement new or improved processes or products which 
contributes to production of renewable energy or materials, reduces use of natural resources, 
reduces harm caused by fossil fuels, or reduces pollution through products, processes or 
advice (UNCSD UN-Report, 2012); or put in a more simplistic manner: technological efforts 
that mitigate environmental harm. Such technologies include everything from photovoltaic 
panels for the capturing of solar energy to hose nozzles for saving water when cleaning 
slaughterhouse work stations. Looking solely at the manufacturing of clean energy 
technology however, it is observed that the market sector has been, and is currently, 
outgrowing global GDP. Though having an impressive global growth, the market is maturing 
and growth stabilized at 11% in 2011. However, the forecasts predict that the total clean 
energy technology market in 2015 will be in the area of EUR 240 and 290 billion; in fact 
catching up with the oil and gas equipment market. (WWF 2012) Important to notice on the 
other hand is the global distribution of where the cleantech growth is strong. As of 2010 
China has been the number one country when it comes to cleantech development, 
accounting for 49% of all global cleantech initial public offerings (IPO‟s), with the US and 
Europe trailing behind at 2nd and 3rd place respectively. Interestingly, China was behind both 
the US and Europe in terms of receiving international and domestic venture capital funding, 
so called high-risk capital, with US$410 million, making it the third largest cleantech market 
in the world. As cleantech is a matter of innovation and carrying a venture to the market, the 
situation cannot be explained merely by low-cost manufacturing in China (Ernst & Young, 
2010). This mismatch between investments and successful IPO‟s suggest that both the US 
and Europe are failing to provide the same bang-for-the buck as China, which further could 
indicate national policies that do not operate or function effectively to generate the desired 
outcome; CT companies on the market that make a profit, gain market shares, create jobs 
and inflict environmental benefits while doing so. Venture capital (VC) for developing and 
nurturing the cleantech industry is being pointed at as one of the main drivers for innovation 
and successful CT enterprises (Gompers & Lerner, 2004), and public policies are among the 
main facilitators of VC investments (Ernst & Young, 2010). Alongside being the facilitator of 
external private investments, the government also increasingly invests public capital into CT 
ventures to adjust for the current lack of private capital going into the sector (Collen & 
Lidgren, 2012). This trend gives the government multiple roles in cleantech venture funding, 
acting as a facilitator, investor, public stakeholder, and possibly shareholder in CT venture 
equity. Holding a complex position in CT venture capital funding, the government face 
multiple challenges in terms of delivering a direct support policy to make cleantech a 
successful proliferating sector. This thesis will explore some of those challenges and seek to 
find a remediation or best practice through case studies and interviews and draw from several 
European experiences. 
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1.1 Background 
 
Why cleantech is important 
Facing such environmental challenges as increasing consumption, waste production, energy 
use, climate change, and an overhanging challenge of transitioning from fossil to renewable 
energy scources does challenge the reach of technology. Part of an answer to deal with these 
challenges can be attributed to cleaner technologies. The World Economic and Social Survey 
of 2011 states that major investments are needed and will be needed in the future in order to 
scale up renewable energy production, climate-proofing infrastructure, reducing waste 
production and making food production more sustainable. The report estimates that 
investments in the scale of USD 1.9 trillion per year will be required in order not to 
compromise the sustainability of our planet. (UNCSD- UN Report, 2011) As a response to 
international unification in regards to these problems, companies and corporations have 
started to look towards the transformational opportunities that come along with the global 
transition. In relation to this and according to an Ernst & Young report (2011), a segment 
which is being held up as the most important is cleantech. In the same report, E&Y foresees 
that cleantech will grow rapidly as companies move away from value technologies and aim 
for breakthrough technologies that can open up completely new streams of revenue. 
Cleantech venture capital 
Venture capital, often mixed with private equity, is high-risk capital invested in early stage 
business or product development. Its bigger brother, private equity, is an active form of 
investment which often aims to better the operations of a company that is not listed on a 
stock exchange over multiple years. Hence, venture capital is a kind of private equity, but 
with focus on early stage businesses. (EVCA 2012) The rationale behind a VC investment is 
to, at an early stage, provide a company with capital in exchange for equity so that the 
company can develop a technology, service or general business idea to the point where the 
company reaches market and can generate a profit for the investors. A VC investor often 
diversifies his portfolio (group of companies) over a wide range of technologies or markets 
in order to reduce the risk of his investments.  
Generally speaking, global venture capital as a whole has been on a downwards slope the 
later years with a decrease of 20% in 2012. In a European perspective the decrease was 16% 
the same year, but also showing a shift towards later-stage investments. The financial unease 
regarding the Eurozone and the tightening of the financial market in terms of new 
regulations (e.g. the Basel III and Solvency II Directive) has made capital more expensive in 
more ways than one, hence decreasing the will to invest in VC‟s. (Ernst & Young, 2012) 
Following the decline of private capital, governments started to invest the larger share of the 
VC funds, hence making themselves the major player in cleantech venture capital funding. 
This is in particular true for the Nordic countries and most European countries. 
The hurdles of cleantech and governmental problems in addressing them 
The funding gap of cleantech, or so-called “Valley of Death” (see Figure 1.1), is described as 
the notorious enemy of cleantech caused by the industry‟s inherent long-time-to-market 
problem. The technological development is regarded as quite capital intensive, hence making 
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both difficult and sometimes undesirable for investors to invest. At the same time, 
commercializing a never before used technology is noted to be a challenge that even further 
delays market entry. Also, to understand the situation of the CT industry, consider this 
example given by the Green Alliance, UK: an executive manager for a major oil company 
was asked why he so easily could invest a substantive sum of money in a new oil technology 
that would not pay back in ten years or more. The reply was simply that he knew people 
would use the product (oil) he invested in also in ten years. (UK Green Alliance, 2013) It is a 
lot easier investing in technology that is aimed at delivering something known to be desired 
or used in the future than investing in technology with high market uncertainty. This 
uncertainty is directly transferable to risk, a limiting investment factor to most investors. 
Also, there is uncertainty where in the venture chain the public should focus their efforts. 
Should public funding for cleantech target more R&D or should later stages, like 
demonstration and commercialization be the main objective for public VC? This question is 
indicative of uncertainty whether more money for R&D will generate the desirable ventures 
needed to attract private VC, or if public support should be aimed at later stages, like 
commercialization and demonstration. (Private Comunication, 2013) This question poses 
one of the major challenges to governmental cleantech intervention, and is debated heavily 
(DN-Debate, 2013).  
1.2 Purpose and Aim of the study 
1.2.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to add to the current knowledge on how policies for public VC 
funding of cleaner technologies can be carried out in an efficient way. Having the current 
understanding that public funding for early-stage cleantech ventures is not a one-size-fits-all 
system; the author believes that it is beneficial to explore the functionalities within intricate 
funding models in order to best be able to construct a better working public funding system 
for cleantech in the future. While not undermining its‟ importance, the purpose of this study 
is not to elaborately explain the full context of every funding system, but rather look at 
determinant factors that are relevant on a more general basis. 
1.2.2 Aim 
The author aims to do so by looking at some international cases of public early-stage funding 
for cleantech, getting inputs from stakeholders, determining good practices and obstacles 
with the individual cases, and finally provide a number of recommendations on what a public 
VC policy for cleantech funding should take into consideration. 
1.3 Research question(s) 
How should governmental VC instruments be constructed in order to spur increased and 
self-sustained cleantech investments? 
(I) How can public investment instruments be constructed to attract and leverage 
private capital? 
(II) How can national and supra-national regulations affect the operation of public VC 
instruments? 
1.4 Methodology 
In advance of this thesis, a preliminary literature review was conducted in order to establish 
the main problems related to the topic, as well as for the sake of determining the areas on 
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which to focus. The author considered three main issues when arriving at the problem 
definition. It was first noticed that (1) there is an existing funding gap in cleantech and that 
(2) governments are increasingly spending public capital to cover the diminishing private 
investments, making themselves the main investor in the sector. Further it was noticed that 
there are multiple variations in which way governments fund the cleantech venture sector, 
and also variations in level of success, which made the author wonder (3) what the role of 
governments should or could be in the scenario at hand. On the background of this, the 
author‟s logic was to see whether it was possible to find a set of good practices and notable 
limitations based on multiple different learning cases in a European context.  
After the initial literature review, the author chose a number of countries to find case studies 
in. The reasoning behind choosing the specific counties was to have both Scandinavian and 
European examples, hence covering both small-region and large-region contexts and views. 
The countries chosen were Germany, the UK, Norway and Finland. Germany was logically 
on the list because of their success in establishing and running two consecutive large-size 
cleantech venture funds. UK was chosen because of their innovative public governance in 
relation to cleantech funding, Norway because they were one of the best in cleantech in 
Scandinavia up until recently, and finally Finland because of good connections with TEKES, 
the Finnish funding agency for technology and innovation.  
As this study addresses venture capital funding for the cleantech sector, and not one type of 
venture capital funding for cleantech, the author chose to select case studies that not 
necessarily had the same approach in order to get a wider view on the subject.  
Having established the main question at hand and the countries to look at, a literature review 
was conducted. The author deemed that this thesis topic is bilateral, dealing with two 
principal issues; public governance and financial systems. Hence, literature from both areas 
was looked into. The purpose of the review was to establish what is currently known about 
governmental funding systems in relation to cleantech (covering both public governance and 
financial theory). Emerging from the review were a set of topics which are relevant in the 
context of public funding for the cleantech venture sector, and these were again used as 
criteria, or framework, for the analysis section of this paper. In addition to the criteria 
defined by literature, one criteria regarding legal context was added upon request by the 
initiator of the public funding for cleantech project.  
The data collection was based on two main methodological approaches: interviews and 
literature search on the cases. Having a defined problem and a defined set of criteria 
emerging from the literature review the author set up interviews with a number of people, 
representing various roles in the complex cleantech funding system. The roles represented in 
the interviews were fund managers, cleantech venture consultants, public cleantech venture 
fund/grant officers, public policymakers, and cleantech business owners. This was done to 
get a holistic perspective of the issue.  
The interview questions were carefully tailored to fit the interviewees, acknowledging the 
different perspectives and knowledge prevailing within their respective working roles. The 
questions were also guided by the criteria defined by the literature review, enabling the 
answers to be used for benchmarking/comparison in the analysis. The questions had two 
main objectives; letting the interviewee express his or her opinion on certain issues, and to 
get additional information on a specific case. Further, the interviews were semi structured 
and open ended, allowing the respondent to develop the answer in the direction he or she 
saw natural. The author did however have a distinct idea of what he wanted from the 
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interviews; hence follow-up questions were asked if the respondent did not answer the 
original question. Follow-up questions were also asked when the respondent developed an 
answer providing new information to the author. The author also chose the interviewees 
based upon an idea that it would be beneficial to interview someone who had connection to 
the instruments in question, plus to get the external view of experts on the field.  
The interviews were then transcribed in detail and prepared for qualitative coding. Emerging 
from the interviews as a whole was a set of topics that had come up in one or more ways. 
These topics were made into headings under which the author sorted the different coded 
statements. Since the questions for the interviews were guided by the analytical framework, 
the topics, or headings, emerging from the interview answers could be compared to the 
framework.  
In the analysis, interviewee findings and case data was merged and addressed under the 
appropriate heading in the framework. From this it became possible to unravel some of the 
main factors in terms of public VC instrument design.  
1.5 Scope and limitations 
Within the sphere of governmental funding for tech venture companies, there are three main 
public programmes according to the OECD guidelines for governmental funding of 
technology based companies (1997): 
i) Direct supply of capital to venture capital firms or small firms. This often takes the 
shape of low interest loans, grants, or equity investments made by the 
government either directly through public venture capital funds or through 
hybrid capital venture funds (private-public).  
ii) Financial incentives for investing in a venture capital firm or a small firm. Typical 
incentives are for instance tax credits or deductions and different types of 
financial guarantees; i.e. on loans and private equity.  
iii) Regulations, controlling types of venture capital investors. There are regulations 
that prohibit or inhibit specific institutional investments. They can be seen as the 
laws, policies, or guidelines that regulate who should be allowed to invest in what 
and even how much can be invested. One example could be the allowance of 
public pension funds to invest in the cleantech venture capital market.  
While not underestimating the effect or necessity of the regulations the focus of this thesis 
will be the direct investments and some financial incentives, or the direct supply of capital to 
venture capital firms or small firms. Hence, the last category will not be part of the scope of 
this study. Developing the scope further, direct venture capital investments into cleantech 
cannot be characterized as one single financial transfer of capital. Depending on how 
scholars define and divide it, the so-called innovation funnel consists of four to five phases, 
and in this case the author chose to use five: applied research, basic research, development, 
demonstration, and market entry. Finances are needed at all stages of the funnel, but the 
capital intensity differs significantly and hence, so does the providers of the capital. The 
financial incentives addressed in this study will aimed at funding within the funding gap. 
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Figure 1.1 The innovation funnel and the equity gap of cleantech. (Sources: Canadian Funding Gap. 
SDTC, 2013) 
 
 
A limiting factor to this paper was the fact that many of the stakeholders desirable to 
interview are very busy. This goes especially for the fund managers and the private investors 
of the different funds. The author of this paper had to, according to the restricted time of 
some of the interviewees, cut many questions. Although this was in part negative, the author 
had foreseen this issue and knew which questions were most relevant. The original number 
of interviewees had to be cut as well, as there was a low response rate to the interview 
requests (primarily requests by phone). Another limiting factor was the fact that the thesis 
work took place during summer; and the author experienced that many public employees 
were on holiday, not being able to reply or be available for interviews until very late in the 
thesis process.  
Another limitation of this thesis is that a GVCIP is not a stand-alone instrument or tool to 
deal with the entirety of cleantech growth and innovation. As this thesis only looks at direct 
governmental investment programmes aimed at cleantech venture capital, it should be seen 
as an exploration of one policy segment as a part of a larger policy package. As discovered 
from literature, direct public venture capital investments in cleantech are questioned in 
regards to their contribution to innovation, but at the same time regarded as necessary to 
overcome and fill he „funding gap‟ of this particular tech sector.  
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It should also be noted that the author does not address whether public supply of venture 
capital is better than other policues, such as for instance lowering the taxes on VC revenue. 
This thesis works with VC and public VC instruments in isolation to what others might claim 
to be better alternatives. 
1.6 Analytical framework 
The OECD Guidelines for governmental funding of technology based companies (1997) 
mention six main criteria that are of high importance when designing a funding policy, being 
of a direct or indirect nature. As previously mentioned, this thesis will focus only on the 
direct supply of capital to venture capital firms and small companies. The six criteria will 
serve as the main analytical tool for this paper; not only in terms of benchmarking different 
approaches, but also as an indication of whether there are other aspects of direct funding that 
might be of importance that is not covered by the criteria.  
 
Figure 1.2 Research framework and conceptual research idea 
 
The criteria set by OECD can be found in their entirety below. In addition, one analytical 
criterion was added by the author because of a need exposed by the initiator of the Swedish 
Cleantech Funding Project. Two critera, transparency (how well the policy is communicated), 
and Process were removed from the framework as it would be too substantial for this thesis 
to look into.  
Design - The configuration of schemes must consider the nature and extent of the 
investment incentives, whether they are aimed at venture capital firms or directly at small 
Input 
•Multiple empirical  public  venture capital programme data from different European 
countries 
•Opinions and experiences from experts representing various stakeholder groups 
Analytical 
framework  
•Seven perceived determinants/criteria of good public governance when creating 
successful policies for public venture capital investment programmes 
•Four criteria set by OECD, one added by popular demand (4+1) 
•Analyzing the alignment of international GVCIPs and the  seven criteria. Aiming to 
indicate GVCIP performance  and alignment with the criteria. 
Output 
• Elements of considerable importance when designing public policy instruments for 
cleantech VC funding, and reccomendations for policy  instrument design 
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firms, the stages of investment to be targeted, risk factors and the leveraging effects on 
private capital. 
Additionality - Venture capital programmes should seek to stimulate private sector funding 
and create a commercially viable market, which would allow government schemes to be 
phased out as private sources of capital expand. 
Management - Successful venture capital programmes are those which elicit private sector 
participation in the design stage and where the private sector plays a professional role in the 
programme‟s management. 
Evaluation – One criterion for measuring success is the extent to which venture capital 
funds or small firms are created which can operate on a commercial basis, i.e. generate an 
attractive rate of return.  
Legal acting – This criterion is externally added. In terms of legal acting space there are 
laws and regulations setting certain standards for what a government is allowed to do and for 
what governmental instruments can do. The creativity and movement of governments and 
institutions within the legal sphere is thought to be important when it comes to designing 
and operating successful policies for direct venture funding of early stage tech firms, and for 
cleantech firms in particular.  
The logic behind the authors choice of this particular analytical framework is that policies are 
constantly evolving, not only as a response to governmental desires of perfecting policy 
performance from a societal point of view, but also due to changing external conditions; 
such as evolving markets, new technologies, new laws and regulations, and industrial 
motivations. As cleantech is indeed a quick moving market with development of new 
technologies that are of interest for both society and industry the author chose to use a rather 
wide analytical framework in order to not miss the latest policy innovations or the latest 
cleantech VC segment problems. The relative width of the framework was deliberately 
chosen because the thesis touches upon rapidly changing financial markets, and the author 
did not wish to address “yesterday‟s problems”, as has been pointed out to be an issue with 
public policymaking for cleantech venture capital financing.  
1.7 Literature review 
This literature review will cover the following: 
i) A more general review of governmental intervention in financial markets, and the 
relationship between venture capital and innovation. 
ii) Review of literature that cover aspects of governmental venture capital funding  
1.7.1 Governmental intervention in the VC market and the 
innovation/VC relationship 
The foundation of this thesis rests on an assumption that governments intervene in financial 
markets, such as the early stage capital market for cleantech ventures, because of asymmetric 
information.  According to Akerlof (1970), this is caused by varying levels of information 
obtained by different actors within a market and can skew the success of investments, and 
also suppress entire sectors and cause a market failure as noted by Brander, Egan & 
Hellmann (2008). The latter mentioned scholars also suggest that asymmetric information 
can cause adverse selection among investors as a result of wrong or hidden information. As 
20 
markets are complex, navigating the information needed to manage investment risks can 
prove to be difficult. In relation to cleantech there are quite a few hard-to-manage risks that 
could possibly affect the willingness to invest. One of them is the long term uncertainty 
about the market demand, especially for low-carbon technologies. Another is the interlink 
between markets and sub-markets ; relative certainty about demand and supply for crude oil 
will for instance affect the demand for low-carbon technology  in one way or another since 
both are part of a single energy market (Spencer & Arwas 2012; Bürer & Wüstenhagen 2009; 
and Hargadon & Kenney 2012). The experts in navigating asymmetrical information is 
claimed to be the venture capitalists, gaining an advantage by seeing through and 
understanding wrong or hidden information. Following, the venture capital market exists 
because of this market imperfection, allowing venture capitalists to become experts in 
deciphering information according to Amit, Brander & Zott (1998).  
The rationale for governmental intervention in financial markets is explored by Stiglitz, 
Vallejo & Park (1993) and they suggest that unaccounted externalities can cause severe 
information asymmetries. This can be directly transferred to the relationship between low -
and high-carbon energies, making governmental intervention rational in order to balance the 
market. How they intervene is however up for wide scholarly discussion and debate, 
delivering no lack of literature. Not being able to justify addressing all literature regarding 
state interventions, the author will focus on literature surrounding the support of early stage 
innovative cleantech ventures as a logical response to an imperfect market, as this is the main 
topic of the thesis. 
An important aspect discussed in literature is whether early stage investments actually spur 
innovation, or if it just serves as a buffer to help the specific innovation enter the market; 
basically trying to answer the question: Does venture capital help the development of cleaner 
technologies? Lerner & Kortum (2000) tried assessing this question by looking at the 
relationship between venture capital and patents. They found a strong positive relationship 
between the two, suggesting that VC indeed did contribute to innovation. Also, they raised 
the question whether innovation was as well spurred by the venture capital process, and not 
just the capital investment, signaling that the involvement of industry was of big value for the 
innovators. However, Lerner and Kortum‟s research does not indicate the relative 
disbursement of capital in the innovation process. The positive relationship between patents 
and venture capital does, according to Demirel & Parris (2010), not provide the full picture 
of this relationship. They investigated 80 venture capital backed CT firms in the UK and 
found that most capital became accessible to the CT companies when they were granted a 
patent for their innovation. They also found that the first round of investment was on 
average 0,5 years after companies were being granted a patent, and that merely 16% of all VC 
investments were deployed to the CT companies before a patent was granted or applied for. 
Hence, they imply that VC does have a positive relationship to innovation if the measure is 
number of patents. However, their findings suggest that venture capital follow patents, not 
technology development. Mazzucato (2011) additionally adds to this statement by claiming 
that the increase in patents can better be explained by shifting patent laws and new strategic 
reasons why to use patents, rather than linking it to increased innovation. According to Zider 
(1998), venture capital plays a small role when it comes to innovation. He estimates that 80% 
of the venture capital goes towards later stage (commercialization) development, and only 
6% goes to the start-up phase of a company. Interestingly, research points to the funding gap 
(commercialization) as the major problem of the cleantech venture sector and yet, most of 
the external venture capital is spent at this stage. This signals that there is, not necessarily lack 
of capital in the VC market, but at least lack of attractiveness of the cleantech sector when it 
comes to venture capital investments.  
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1.7.2 Governmental venture capital funding 
Bürer & Wüstenhagen (2009) conducted a survey among venture capital investors and asked 
them what kind of governmental policy they preferred; technology-push or market-pull 
policies. The answers were very clear, indicating a preference for market-pull policies with 
most of the investors ranking feed-in-tariffs the highest. On the other hand, technology push 
policies were less popular, and the single policy that came out with the lowest rank was 
public venture capital funds. From the private investors‟ point of view, governments should 
only establish investment incentives, not overrule the market by picking winning 
technologies. Bürer and Wüstenhagen partly try to explain the lack of support for public 
venture capital funds by suggesting that governments, by entering the venture capital market, 
compete with the private investors, something that is also noted in by the Swedish 
government in a published report on Swedish risk capital (2010). With reference to the 
guidelines of OECD, additionality should, according to them, be one of the key goals for 
governmental venture capital involvement in technology-based companies. Additionality, in 
the context of venture capital programmes, is to aim for stimulation of the investment 
market, allowing the programmes or schemes to be phased out as sources of private capital 
expand. (OECD 1997)  However, while this might be a good criterion for public venture 
funding when the risk market is assumed equal across sectors, the cleantech sector possess 
some traits that would present CT firms with the short end of the stick if the underlying 
assumption is that private investors are rational and allocate capital to wherever the 
risk/potential benefit calculus is better. Manigart & Beuselinck (2001) suggest that VCs 
suffer from so called „equity gaps‟ because venture capital is hard to obtain from private 
sources, hence the logic of public intervention (public funding). Baldock (2012) adds a 
critical point to the equity gap debate by claiming that there is a shift in private equity 
investments towards larger funds aimed at later stage developments, mirroring the fact that 
early stage investments are not anymore regarded as the best option by private investors. 
Baldock mentions high-risk, technological barriers, market uncertainties as critical points, as 
well as the perceived management requirements needed by the VC firms. This portrays a 
picture where cleantech venture firms, with their particularly high market and technology 
risks, would per theoretical economic definition not be able to attract private investments in 
the current market assuming rational investors, making the funding gap especially critical for 
the CT sector. 
Another key aspect of public cleantech VC funding is additionality. Additionality is, as 
interpreted by the UK government, the extent to which an activity takes place at all, or is undertaken 
on a larger scale, or earlier, to a higher standard, or within a policy target area, as a result of public sector 
intervention. The rationale behind this is to avoid unnecessary public spending by trying to 
reach as high of a degree of additionality as possible. A fully additional intervention is 
regarded as a situation where a given activity would not happen at all without public 
involvement. (UK Gov – Economic Appraisal Guidance, 2013) According to Brastad & 
Furre (2011) there are however different ways of measuring the additionality of public 
interventions. The first method of measure, input additionality, is commonly used to measure 
the degree of project initiation as a result of public input. This method does however not 
take into consideration whether the supported project was successful or not, and it‟s 
normally measured by asking the receiver: “What would happen to the project if you did not 
receive this support?” Output, or result additionality, is another option that focuses on the 
results of the initiated projects rather than on the initiation itself. Commonly, this will include 
looking at how well the public financial support initiated successful projects, products, services 
or innovations. As it is public money, the measure of success is based on a socio-economic 
point of view. (Brastad & Furre, 2011) This leaves space for different outcomes in terms of 
calculating public capital performance and efficiency. A study carried out by Friends of the 
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Earth suggests that there are major differences in the way public fianance institutions 
calculate their leverage on private capital. The major problem according to the study is that 
there often is no differentiation between private and public capital, meaning that they count 
it all, hence inflating the leverage ratio. They argue that public funds cannot be leveraged as 
they are already earmarked and would have been used for achieving the objective anyway (i.e. 
support the demonstration stage of cleantech products). (Friends of the Earth, 2013). 
Another UK government best practice guidance document on additionality states that 100% 
additionality can probably never be achieved, because of the great challenges in controlling 
all factors from a state intervention point of view. However, best practice suggests that state 
interventions should aim to „design out‟ any possible non-additionality. (UK GOV 
Additionality Guide, 2008) What can be seen from literature is that additionality, or non-
additionality, in financial terms, is per definition determinened based on the way of measure. 
Hence, additionality, or rather the choice of additionality measure becomes a key factor when 
assessing the efficiency of public VC policies for cleantech. 
Highly linked to additionality, the aspect of „crowding in‟ or „crowding out‟ is an important 
issue of governmental VC funding. This aspect revolves around whether governmental 
funds, or interventions, displace private capital or if they attract it.  In a still unpublished 
study by Lidgren & Dalhammar (2013) it was noted that for a start-up venture in Finland it is 
almost a prerequisite to have been granted public funds from the public body TEKES in 
order to get access to private venture capital at a later stage. The rationale is, according to the 
study, that governmental funding represents a lower-level boundary that start-ups at least 
need to pass. The survey in the same study found that the receivers of public funds benefited 
from these grants because VC was lacking. From one point of view it can be argued in this 
case that the governmental grant funding crowds in, or at least enables, private VC to come 
in at a later stage. Brander Egan & Hellmann compared the performance of governmental 
backed and privately backed ventures in Canada, and found evidence of private capital being 
crowded out. They reason that privately funded ventures outperform the governmental 
funded ventures, and it is linked to how well the compnies are managed, and especially what 
values VC management has been able to transfer to the venture. Also, Mazzucato (2011) 
claim that through their interventions not only fix current market flaws, but also create new 
ones, which can be seen in relation to potentially crowding out private investments.  
Yet another aspect of public VC funding for the cleantech segment is the management issue. 
Suggesting that VC, and VC receiving firms, can greatly benefit from good and extensive 
networks, Hochberg, Ljungqvist & Lu (2007) note that the performance of well networked 
venture capital funds is far superior of those who have poor networks. Noting that fund 
performance is superior, they also indicate that the portfolio companies have much better 
success if the VC fund management is well connected. Futher, the authors imply that VC 
networks are being constructed around the leader of the deals (Hochberg, Ljungqvist & Lu, 
2008), which evidently indicate that it is beneficial to lead transactions in the VC sector, 
especially in the long run. Lerner (2004) also argues that the requirements of a small-venture 
manager are very dependent on previous experiences. As an example he note that the 
manager should be able to navigate through and avoild legal issues, as this might severly 
affect the firms ability to attract private VC at a  later stage. Therefore he suggests that the 
lack of experienced business mangers in the early-stage ventures can present a big obstacle to 
achieving effective bublic funding measures.  
Though noting the lack of literature on the subject, in a study addressing the design of public 
venture capital programs, Josh Lerner (2004) note some major challenges that in his view is 
important. First of all he claims that there is a tendency that some governmental programs 
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tend to exploit other governmental programs with the aim to increase their own private 
capital leverage ratio. Seccondly, Lerner suggests that the firms, or ventures, that apply for 
and get public grants will get considerable insights to the grant process, making them more 
capable of securing later grants as well. This should be seen in relation to his statement that 
to some degree, publically backed (grants or equity funded) companies tend to be 
underachieving (in a US context) (Lerner, 2004), hence it in an inefficient use of public 
money. Further, Lerner makes a point of the fact that the underachieving companies can 
easily attribute their failure to utilize R&D funds to the high-risk nature of their business; 
hence they will never have to be held accountale for their poor work. As a remediation, he 
suggests that the funding agency should be more critical in terms of funding the same 
company over and over, and especially those who already have acquired private capital prior 
to the governmental grants without any significant results to show for. The logic, Lerner 
argues, is that state funds then are unlikely to have a major effect on the commercialization 
of the product. 
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2 Legal context and background 
This section of the thesis will provide (1) the legal context of public VC funding in the 
cleantech sector, and (2) an overview and presentation of three smaller case studies from the 
UK, Norway, and Germany. The cases are representing various forms of public venture 
capital initiatives in the cleantech sector; both public grant funding mechanisms and venture 
capital funds.  
2.1 EU competition regulations 
One of the most relevant legal considerations in public venture capital is State Aid. State Aid 
is implemented in the EU treaty and governed by the European Commission spawning from 
the rationale that a company that receives governmental aid will gain a competitive advantage 
over its competitiors. It is defined as advantages in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to 
undertakings by national public authorities, and contains the following features:   
 An intervention by the State or through state resources (e.g. grants, tax reliefs, 
guarantees, interest or governmental holdings in a company. 
 The intervention gives the recipient a competitive advantage on a selective basis 
(based on region, sector or specific companies) 
 Competition has been or may be distorted 
 The intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States (European 
commission – Competition 2013). 
To avoid that some companies, sectors or regions get this competitive advantage, there exists 
a general prohibition of state aid. However, state aid can be given if the benefit of doing so 
exceeds the negatives. Due to its complicated legal nature, the author will not look at what 
those situations might be, but on the other hand look at situations where state aid is allowed 
for intervention purposes. In general, state aid is bound to mandatory notification to the 
Commission. There are on the other hand a few exemptions where notification is exempted. 
Aid below EUR 200 000 per undertaking within a three year period, also referred to as de 
minimis aid, is exempted from mandatory notification. Perhaps more valid for this thesis are 
the Block Exemtions.  
The Genral Block Exemption Regulation came into force in 2008 and regulates the specific 
exemptions given to State Aid. It provides exemptions for a number of different public 
undertakings, but in this case it is Article 29; “Aid in the form risk capital”, that is most 
interesting. In order to be exempted from mandatory notification under Article 29, the aid 
should take the form of public participation into a profit driven private equity fund, managed 
on a commercial basis. Further, the maximum allowed capital single undertaking is EUR 1.5 
million per year, whereof 50% should be from private investors. In terms of budget 
allocation, 70% should be invested in equity or quasi-equity (i.e. subordinated debt). Having a 
profit-driven risk capital measure is regarded as important, and this must be secured through 
fulfilling these criteria: 
 A business plan shall exist for each investment, containing details of product, sales 
and profitability development and establishing ex ante viability of project. 
 A clear and realistic exit strategy shall exist for each investment.  
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Finally, there are conditions that must be fulfilled in order to secure the commercial 
operation of the investment fund; 
 There shall be an agreement between a professional fund manager and participants in 
the fund, providing that the manager‟s renumeration is linked to performance and 
setting out the objectives of the fund and proposed timing of investments. 
 Private investors shall be represented in decision-making, such as through in 
investors‟ or advisory committee. 
 Best practices and regulatory supervision shall apply to the management of funds. 
(General Block Exemption Regulation 2008) 
It is however important to remember that this merly constitute the requirements for 
notification exemption in relation to public risk capital and state aid. There are also cases where 
state aid can be provided through notification to the Commission as explained in the next 
section. 
According the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 107; state 
aid must be compatible with the internal market. The same article divides aid compatability 
into two categories; aid that shall be compatible, and aid that can be considered to be 
compatible with the internal market. In the case of “considering compatability”, the 
suggested risk capital policy will be evaluated against “Community guidelines on state aid to 
promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized enterprizes”, hereinafter referred 
to as “The Guidelines”. The guidelines constitute the legal interpretation of “considered 
compatability” for TFEU Article 107 (3) (c). The hierarchical order of regulatory 
considerations a nation‟s state aid scheme has to go through when notifying the Commission 
can be seen in the table below.  
Table 2.1. Order of considerations for notified state aid exemptions (EU Commission, 2013) 
Regulation/Consideration Explanation of regulation/consideration 
TFEU Article 107  Any state aid that distorts or threatens to 
distort competition certain goods shall be 
considered incompatible with the internal 
market and not allowed 
Section (3) Aid considered being compatible with the 
internal market as exemptions. 
Sub-section (c)  Aid to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely 
affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest.  
“Community guidelines on state 
aid to promote risk capital 
investments in small and 
medium-sized enterprises” 
Legal interpretation of Section (c), putting 
forward prerequisites for when state aid can 
be considered to be in accordance to the 
internal market, and conditions for being 
exempted (burden of proof).  
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2.1.1 The EU Community guidelines on state aid to promote risk 
capital in small and medium enterprices 
As noted in the table above, The Guidelines constitute the interpretation and evaluation of 
whether a state aid scheme for public SME risk capital is in line with the common interest, 
hence also the internal market. Important to notice is that this applies only when the scheme 
is notified, and not when it exempted from notification.  
The Guidelines are structured into to main sections; one which assesses the compatability of 
the risk capital scheme in terms of compatability with TFEU Article 107 (3) (c), and one that, 
in detail, assesses the compatability of risk capital measures that are not compatible with Article 
107 (3) (c), in regards to positive and negative effects of the aid. The latter section can be 
seen as cost-benefit assessment that stipulates whether the aid is in line with the common 
interest of the Community (when benefits outweigh the costs) despite not being compatible 
with the TFEU. This means that a particular aid scheme, or parts of it, can be considered to 
not be in line with TFEU Article (3) (c) in section one, but considered to be in line with the 
same in section two because of a more detailed weighing of pro‟s and con‟s. To explain 
further, two examples of different considerations are shown below. 
Figure 2.2 TFEU compatability considerations beyond the stated compatability criteria. (Source: The 
Guidelines 2006) 
Example 1: Maximum levels of investment tranches 
Section 1: The risk capital measure must provide for tranches of finance, whether wholly or 
partly financed by State aid, not exceeding EUR 1.5 million per target SME over each period 
of twelve months. 
Section 2: The Commission is aware of the constant fluctuations of the risk capital market 
and of the equity gap over time, as well as of the different degree by which enterprises are 
affected by the market failure depending on their size, on their stage of business 
development, and on their economic sector. Therefore, the Commission is prepared to 
consider declaring risk capital measures providing for investment tranches exceeding the 
threshold of EUR 1.5 million per enterprise per year compatible with the common market, 
provided the necessary evidence of the market failure is submitted.  
Example 2:  Restriction to seed, start-up and expansion financing 
Section 1: The risk capital measure must be restricted to provide financing up to the 
expansion stage for small enterprises, or for medium-sized enterprises located in assisted 
areas. It must be restricted to provide financing up to the start-up stage for medium-sized 
enterprises located in non-assisted areas. 
Section 2: The Commission recognizes that certain medium-sized enterprises in non-
assisted areas may have insufficient access to risk capital even in their expansion stage 
despite the availability of finance to enterprises having a significant turnover and/or total 
balance. Therefore, the Commission is prepared to consider declaring measures partly 
covering the expansion stage of medium-sized enterprises compatible with the common 
market in certain cases, provided the necessary evidence is submitted. 
 
The examples above show two (out of a total of seven) examples of how the Commission 
opens up for a wider interpretation of TFEU Article 107. Assuming that a fictive state aid 
27 
scheme is designed with a maximum financial tranch of EUR 3 million, it would be found 
not compatible with the internal market when notified according to example 1, section 1. 
However, if the State provides sound proof that the market failure specific for the chosen 
sector can justify the EUR 3 million financial tranch, it might still be considered in line with 
the internal market according to example 1, section 2. The second example describes a 
limitation for the width of public financial measures aimed at middle-sized enterprises, but 
open for exemptions if the State can prove that there are sectorial limitations in expansion 
capital for the same kind of companies. Common for both examples and for these 
exemptions in general, is that legitimate proof must be provided by the State, and that the 
suggested deviation (suggested by the State) must be proportionate to the evidence (i.e. that 
the deviating amount of public expansion financing for middle-sized companies reflects the 
lack of available sectorial expansion capital on the market). An example of how these 
considerations are applied in reality will be provided in the next section of this paper. 
2.1.2 Legal application  
Case introduction 
The German High-Tech Gründerfonds II (HTGF II) notified the Comission about their 
early-stage high risk capital fund in 2011, and the report from the trial committee was 
published online the same year. The purpose of the HTGF II is, as stated by the German 
government; to close the current seed financing gap persistent to the high-tech sector and to fund small 
companies that have an R&D project at the core of their business and to enable them to reach „proof of 
concept‟. In the report given by the trial committee, the HTGF will provide seed funding and 
seek to include private investors while doing so. It is also stated that follow-up investments 
will be made in some of the companies that initially got seed funding to show that the fund 
believes in them (in order to attract private VC) and to avoid dilution of the shares owned by 
the fund. Some of these follow-up investments will exceed EUR 2.5 million, but private 
investors will provide at least 50% of this amount. Further, if possible, fresh capital will not 
be used for the follow-up investments, as it is preferable to make use of the subordinate 
convertible loans (from an earlier phase of seed funding). The size of the fund will be in the 
range of EUR 260 to 280 million and it is estimated that over 300 companies will receive 
funding. The German government will provide about 85-90% of this capital, and private 
investors the remaining amount.  
Commission case ruling 
The Commission pointed out that the HTGF II was initially not compatible with the internal 
market according to TFEU Article 107 as it could potentially distort competition. However, 
on the basis of Article 107 (3) (c), which is an exemption in regards to “aid that facilitates the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does 
not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”, the aid 
scheme was tried against the criteria manifesting the above mentioned exemption, namely 
The Guidelines.  
The Commission found that the HTGF did not comply with the maximum financing trench 
of 2.5 million per undertaking per year, as the follow up investments would make the sum 
larger. They also found that the funding did not stipulate „state aid‟ at the level of the fund or 
at the level of the receiving companies as they claimed that the HTGF was a vehicle for 
delivering funding to companies that did not have access to this capital on the market; hence 
the HTGF did not benefit from the aid, and neither did the receiving companies as they 
basically just got what they should have had in the first place. 
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The Commission pointed out that the participation of private investors in the fund was not 
guaranteed for follow up investments, and that the share of private capital in the fund was 
not close to 50%. However, they claim that since follow up investments will be made with at 
least 50% share of private capital and equally shared risks, it is a „pari-passu‟ situation and that 
it because of this does not stipulate state aid on the investor level; hence it is in accordance to 
The Guidelines. 
The final ruling was, despite non-conformance with „size of tranches‟ (over EUR 2.5 million 
per investment) and „participation by private investors‟ (not a 50/50 capital share in the 
fund), that the HTGF II was declared compatible with The Guidelines and therefore also 
compatible with the internal market according to TFEU Article 107 (3) (c). As compatability 
with The Guidelines is a cost/benefit weighing, the final ruling can be seen as somewhat of a 
„positive compromise‟. On the pluss side of the weight scale the Commission pointed out, 
amongst others, that: 
 Private investors are openly called to aquire shares in the fund. 
 The Fund will be managed commercially 
 The size of the fund is sufficient to absorb transaction costs 
 The number of funded companies is sufficient for spreading risk 
 The scheme will in all probablility “crowd in” rather than “crowd out” private 
investors 
Conclusively, this case shows that design of public risk capital schemes or policies are limited 
to some extent by EU Competition legislation, but that there is room for interpretation and 
maneuverability in terms of divergence from legislation. (EU Commission – Letter to 
Member state, 2012) 
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3 Governmental VC funds for cleantech development 
3.1 The policy instruments 
3.1.1 The Carbon Trust Fund, UK 
The Carbon Trust is a UK government backed company, or green body, that was originally 
set up to accelerate the move towards a low-carbon economy in the UK. The company has 
developed and provides advice for both businesses and governments in terms of low-carbon 
development. Besides acting as a consultant, the Carbon Trust also finances, develop and 
deploy low-carbon technologies. The venture funding arm of the Carbon Trust is advised by 
350 Investment Partner LLP, a venture capital fund management company that spun out of 
the Carbon Trust as their public venture capital engagement commenced in 2001. 350 IP 
identify appropriate investment opportunities, conduct due diligence, negotiate and structure 
the transactions, as well as monitor and manage investments made by the Carbon Trust fund 
intil the companies exit. In addition to the Carbon Trust, 350 IP also manage an EU-regional 
cleantech evergreen investment fund, called the North West fund. Out of its EUR 184.8 
million, EUR 20 million is earmarked for cleantech; specifically addressing the equity gap and 
gaps in lending. (350IP-About us 2013) 
The portfolio under 350 IP‟s management consists of about 30 companies, most of which 
have a connection to energy generation, consumtion, infrastructure, and services. The focus 
on energy can be seen in relation to the fundamental goal of the company Carbon Trust: to 
accelerate the transition towards a low-carbon eonomy. The Carbon Trust fund, advised by 
the 350 IP, is one of the largest investors in early-stage cleantech in the UK. However, they 
do only co-invest alongside private investors, taking a maximum share of 50% of the total 
investment. Typically, the Carbon Trust contribution is between EUR 290K - 4.7 million, 
while the typical total investment (with co-investors) is EUR 585K – 11.7 million.  
As most VC funds, the Carbon Trust also has a set of investment criteria that companies 
need to fulfill in order to be eligible: 
 Must be UK based 
 Must be innovative – Prove innovation in technology design or its application 
 Have a clear financial position – Provide a detailed statement of the organisation‟s 
economic viability 
 Must have management experience – Relevant sector experience and commitment to 
turn business plan into reality 
 Show competitive advantage  
 Provide market assessment – Profile key commercial markets and critical market 
drivers 
 Itellectual property – Confirm what intellectual property rights (IPR‟s) exist prior to 
investment, and show how IPR‟s will be utilized and protected after investment. 
 Funding partners – Identify other private investors; we only invest up to 50% in any 
one transaction. (350IP Investment Focus) 
During its years of existence, the Carbon Trust fund has had five exits whereof three of them 
were trade sales and two of them were listings. In terms of exit success, all exits were 
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profitable, though some more profitable than others. The latest exit was in March 2013 when 
the company Arieso, a network optimizing solutions provider, was acquired by JDSU for 
USD 85 million. This was a trade sale generating a 4.7 times return for the CTF. Another 
example is a fuel cell company that was traded for a 2.7 times return. Though having 5 
successful exits, the CTF has had 4 companies going under during the years. These so-called 
write-offs make out about 11% of the portfolio companies that was ever in the portfolio, and 
the fund is despite these profitable as a whole. (350 IP web, and Personal Communication, 
2013)  
3.1.2 High-Tech Gründerfonds, Germany 
According to a study performed by the World Wildlife Fund in 2012, Germany ranks 3rd in 
the world when it comes to sales of clean technology, only beaten by China and the US 
respectively. When comparing cleantech sales as a part of the country‟s total economy 
(relative ranking), Germany still ranks 3rd, only beaten by Denmark and China. (WWF 2012) 
This makes them a major player in the cleantech industry, and well worth having a look at in 
terms of how they spur CT growth and innovation.  
The High-Tech Gründerfonds (HTGF) is an early stage venture capital fund set up in 2005 
on the provisions of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. It is not 
solely a public venture capital fund as it is also open for industry and co-investing angels or 
other private capital. However, the main part of capital is provided by the government; more 
specifically: the first fund was EUR 272 million whichof the government provided EUR 240 
million, which leaves EUR 32 million provided by private capital. The second fund was EUR 
301.5 where the government contributed with EUR 220 million and the private sector EUR 
81.5 million. (Interview 1) As can be seen from this, the first fund proportionately had a 
higher degree of public capital than the second fund. This can be explained partly because of 
a higher numer of industrial companies that took part in the fund (HTGF Web 2013). Since 
the beginning of the fund, approximately 250 companies have received investments from the 
HTGF, whereof 19 within the cleantech segment. (HTGF Web 2013) As the fund is not 
fundamentally a cleantech venture capital fund, it has a much diversified portfolio, expanding 
across start-up companies within the high-tech sector in Germany. The primary aim of 
HTGF is to support the German seed market for high-tech early-stage companies, 
something that is highlighted in the company‟s mission statement (HTGF Mission Statement 
2013). In order to receive investments the eligible companies must comply with the HTGF 
investment criteria; below presented in a comprised manner.  
 There must be a technical orientation that is significant in innovation, and the idea or 
product must be close to “proof of concept”. In addition, the human capital in the 
company should posess technical knowledge, and intellectual property rights should 
be protected and exclusive for the company. 
 In terms of market position the product or service should have a clear benefit for the 
end user as well as provide a competitive advantage. There should also be 
considerable barriers to entry for competition. Finally, the market should enable big 
growth potential for the company. 
 The company teasm should be characterized by a high degree of motivation, know-
how, willingness to succeed, and business experience. There should also be an 
appropriate financial contribution from the company.  
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 The company should not have been operating for more than one year. Further, the 
company should be defined as a small company according to the EU, having no 
more than 50 employees and not having a turnover that exceeds EUR 10 million.  
(HTGF Investment Criteria 2013) 
If complying with the criteria, the start-up company must fulfill the investment terms; the 
provisions of engaging in a business relationship with HTGF. These terms are comprised 
below. 
 The initial funding consists of a subordinated convertible loan up to EUR 500K. In 
exchange the HTGF aquire a 15% nominal share of the company. 
 HTGF reserves an additional EUR 1.5 million for follow up funding that the 
company can access by reahing targets and milestones. 
 The loan has a term of 7 years with an interest of currently 10%. Interest will 
however be deferred for 4 years to maintain the company‟s liquidity. 
 The company needs to match 20% of the HTGF investment, either provided by own 
money or sourced through other private investors (HTGF Investment Terms 2013) 
In practice, this means that the HTGF lends a company up to EUR 500K in the initial phase. 
The loan subordinate and convertible, which means that if the company should file for 
bankruptcy, the loan has last priority when settling debt. The convertible element allows for 
the loan to later be transferred into equity; in this case a 15% nominal share.  
 
3.1.3 Environmental Technology Scheme, Norway 
The Environemental Technology Scheme (ETS) is a specific financial support fund for new 
environmental technologies governed by Innovation Norway, the governments‟ most 
important instrument for innovation and development of Norwegian enterprises and 
industry. Funding can be granted to any company in Norway, big or small, as long as the 
developed technology is within the cleantech area. In addition, one criterion is that the grants 
should be for preparing and entering the market, and not early stage tech development or 
operational costs. The support available is divided according to the size of the company. The 
different shares of total project contribution can be seen below.  
Figure 3.1 Shares of total financial support according to size of the enterprise. (Source: Innovation Norway – 
ETS Pamplet, 2013) 
 Small enterprises Medium enterprises Large enterprises 
Funding support in 
% 
45% 35% 25% 
. 
A thorough explanation of the thought behind the ETS is given in the policy and guideline 
document meant to support the arrangement. The overall goal, as stated in the document, is 
promote Norwegian cleantech in national and international markets and contribute to the 
strengthening of Norwegian industry. Further, the selection of projects to receive support is 
guided by some general provisions: 
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 The project should be socioeconomically profitable before receiving support, and 
after receiving support. 
 The project should have a high degree of innovation and the technology or service 
should have a considerable growth potential internationally. 
 The environmental benefits of the project (technology/service) should be quantified 
and proven to be better than already existing technologies or services. 
 The ability of the applicant to carry out the business plan is important. 
 Financial support is only given to Norwegian businesses  
Additionality is also mentioned as one important aspect of the financial support. According 
to the policy, the financial support provided by ETS aims to enable the execution of 
demonstrative cleantech projects that would not have been carried out under normal 
circumstances. As the ETS aims to support development projects with high risk, 
governmental support is thought to be important. However, the policy also states that 
governmental capital is alone not enough to carry out the full business plan, hence the 
owners‟ capital and access to capital is given consideration when selecting who should be 
granted funding. This can be seen in relation to the overarching goal of the ETS, that they 
spark the development of a cleantech product or service so that it can be commercialized and 
successful on the market. As a further response to this, the ETS provide bonus capital 
injections to those companies who manage to attract private co-investors to the project. 
Given that the private investors are companies within the EU/EEC and provide no more 
than 70% of the total project funding, and additional 15% funding bonus can be provided by 
the ETS. The ETS is not a stand-alone tool for bringing ideas to market, but should be seen 
as one helping step on that road, something that is highlighted in the policy. The public 
funds allocated to the ETS are about EUR 33 million per year and it is given out as grants for 
cleantech projects. (Innovation Norway Web 2013, and Personal Communication, 2013) 
In 2011, Pöyry Consulting conducted a survey on the funding performance of the capital 
provided by Innovation Norway. The report looked at the degree of additionality of the 
funding, the funds relative contribution to innovation within a specific sector, the 
characteristics of the fund receiving companies, the geographical width of the developed 
product or service among the fund receiving parties, and the funds importance to the 
businesses regarding their ability to secure a bank loan. According to the survey, 63% of the 
funding provided by the ET scheme was characterized as having a high degree of 
additionality, 30% had a medium degree of additionality and 4% a low degree. Additionality 
was calculated based on one question asked to the grant receiving parties: “What do you 
think would happen to the project/service if you would not have received the grant from 
Inovation Norway?” Further, 76% of the products that got support by the ETS were 
innovative on an international arena according to the survey. (IN Customer Effect Analysis 
2012) 
3.1.4 Vigo Accelerator Programme, Finland 
The Vigo Accelerator Program (VAP) is a funding program designed to bridge the gap 
between the early-stage technology ventures and international venture funding. The program 
selects the best companies with the best excecutives and co-invests alongside with them in 
order to achieve aligned development goals and effort. The fund is under the management of 
Profict Partner Oy, a company that employs expertize in internationalization and growth in 
tech-companies (Vigo – About, 2013 & Profict – About 2013). The goals of the VAP are 
defined by four main points: 
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 Give incentives to the best business developers in order to help the most promising 
start-ups grow into successful companies. 
 Ensure early-stage funding for start-ups, increase their shareholder value, and make 
the start-ups attractive targets for venture investors. 
 Continue to raise significant venture capital investments after the acceleration stage 
to support expansion of the target companies. 
 Invigorate the Finnish venture capital market and bring more international 
acceleration and venture capital players into Finland. (Vigo – Goals, 2013) 
In addition to these goals, there is a goal to cover the equity gap by phasing out the VAP and 
letting a self-sustained market operate freely. The idea is that, through the incentives given by 
the VAP, the private market will be covering the equity gaps. (Vigo Report, 2013 and Private 
communication, 2013)  
Through a public procurement process (public tender) the VAP acquired a number of 
Accelerators; experienced private companies with proven business expertise, networks and 
funding experience. The ventures being granted access to the program will be assigned an 
Accelerator company who then co-invests with the venture and takes a role in terms of both 
operation and strategy, adding valuable expertise in raising private VC and managing the 
company towards growth. In order to be selected as an Accelerator, the company must 
comply with a number of criteria as set put by the tender. 
In order to be an Accelerator, the company must: 
 Be a limited liability for-proft company 
 Be able to invest in the venture portfolio 
 Managers must own the majority of the shares of the company (Accelerator) 
 Have a clear operational focus based on the skills and expertize of the managers 
 Employ two managers full-time to work with the portfolio companies  
 Have experience in founding, developing and internationalizing innovative businesses 
and acting as responsible investors in young innovative enterprises (Vigo – Open 
tender criteria, 2013) 
The Vigo Accelerator Programme can not be seen as a fund, but rather as mobilizer and 
attractor of private funds. The rationale for being an Accelerator is first of all increased 
exposure and access to prospective venture firms that in the long run can give returns in 
relation to exits. Second of all, the Accelerator companies can charge their portfolio 
companies management fees, something that the ventures again can write off as projects 
costs and get refunded from another Finnish VC grant instrument called “Funding for 
Young Inovative Companies”, or YIC.  The portfolio companies under management of the 
Accelerators qualify for „prefered treatment‟, a regulation that gives them access to YIC 
grants for a period of 18-24 months. In addition to giving them access to YIC grants, they 
also get streamlined priority access to other public grants and financial benefits in order to 
accommodate the development of the portfolio. (Vigo Report, 2013) 
There is no requirement that the different Accelerators have the same organizational 
structure of function as long as they fulfill the targets of the Vigo programme (developing 
early-stage firms by investing and securing external investments) (Private communication, 
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2013) Further, in the deployment of the programme, rish sharing was emphasized to be 
important. This could be achieved, according to the Vigo report, by require the Accelerators 
to invest in the portfolio and take an active role. Cleantech Invest, being the Accelerator for 
the cleantech segment, was evaluated in a mid-term report in 2013 and was found to be the 
top investor among all the Accelerators, having spent 65% of their budget, as well as being 
ranked 4th in sourcing external capital to the portfolio and 4th in terms of acquiring the most 
portfolio companies. Futher, Cleantech Invest consists of a smaller team of four members 
and the company has an investment focus in their interventions. (Vigo Report, 2013) 
Since its start up in 2009, the VAP has raised EUR 100 million accumulatively for all the 
ventures involved, and EUR 130 million if IPO‟s and exits are counted as well.  Out of the 
raised EUR 130 million, 60% comes from private investors. (Vigo press release, 2013) 
3.2 Policy instrument comparison 
The policy VC instruments looked at in this study display different ways of developing early-
stage cleantech. The idea of this comparison is to point out the various approaches in order 
to create an   
First of all, the widths of the programs are not the same. The Environmental Technolgy 
Scheme in Norway has a narrow focus on the demonstration stage of cleantech and a 
mandate to only support projects. The two funds, the Carbon Trust Fund and the HTGF, 
have a wider investment focus in terms of stage of the business; from R&D seed to exit. 
However, the fund with the seemingly most independent stage focus is the Carbon Trust 
Fund. As they function as a normal private VC company, they are free to invest at whatever 
stage of business they feel is attractive (as there is no age criteria for the ventures), both for 
them and for their private co-investors. This allows them to fit both the venture and the 
stage of the venture to the potential investor, something that can be seen as positive in order 
to secure the best potentially lucrative deals.  The HTGF on the other hand has majority 
focus on seed funding with a mandate to invest in firms under the age of 1 year. This can be 
seen in relation to the purpose of the fund, which is to support the seed market of high-tech 
firms in Germany. Though focusing mainly on seed funding, the HTGF also provide follow-
up funding to potentially successful ventures that also received seed funding. This is done on 
a secondary basis (not the main priority in the mandate of the fund), and happens through 
50/50 public/private investments, with capital provided from the convertible loans (no fresh 
capital). The author interprets the HTGF to be a broad seed fund with an aim to create 
attractive firms that are able to attract private VC in the future. The follow-up investments 
should be seen as success-statements for the seed funding rather than the purpose of the 
HTGF. These differences in the design and mandate of the two funds can be seen as 
different approaches to support cleantech development. On one hand it can be claimed that 
a VC fund with a relatively marginal impact surface, such as the Carbon Trust Fund, does 
not constitute the needed effects in order to have a real impact on the cleantech VC market. 
This can be though to be the case when the average VC fund in the US (among 462 VC 
companies) manages EUR 133 million and the Carbon Trust manages EUR 55 million. 
(NVCA FAQ, 2010) On the other hand it is reasonable to argue that the private VC 
companies operate free of all public geographical and sectoral guidelines, hence the size of 
the funds are not comparable in terms of potentially focused impact on the cleantech 
segment, especially considering the funding gap. The size of the budget of the ETS cannot 
be fully compared to the VC funds as it can be regarded to be sunken costs from the public 
point of view. The Vigo Accelerator programme is operation with at least two main 
objectives; namely to support the seed market and to increase the number of companies that 
get „A-round‟ funding. They define the size of „A-round‟ funding to be somewhere between 
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EUR 2-5 million and aim to have at least 20 companies (across all venture segments) to get 
this kind of external VC. (Vigo Report, 2013) Though having some of the same fundamental 
objectives as the HTGF, the VAP is not a top-managed fund where all capital is gathered in a 
single pot.  
The impact scope of the HTGF can be thought to be somewhat wider as they have seed-
funded a larger number of companies, though only a smaller amount of them being in the 
cleantech segment. The author interprets that the general thought behind the fund, seed-
funding for creating attractive firms for private VC, is based on the rationale that „what exists 
must be improved‟, as opposed to the Carbon Trust Fund rationale that the author sees as 
„what is there is good enough, but not tapped into and managed correctly‟. The rationale 
behind the ETS is also similar to the Carbon Trust Fund, having focus on promoting what 
already exists. 
In terms of type of investments, the Carbon Trust Fund has no maximum limit to how much 
equity they can own in any given portfolio company. The HTGF on the other hand can only 
own 25% equity in any given company. The rationale, as previously mentioned, is that the 
German government wants to avoid a large number of state-owned companies. In one way 
this limits the funds ability to make the big profits on single companies, but it is also a risk 
diversifying measure. Further, the number of portfolio companies in the fund can be seen as 
more risk absorbent than the smaller Carbon Trust Fund. This means that the Carbon Trust 
Fund is more sensitive to sectoral changes, such as energy prices, changes in private capital 
flow, etc.  
 
Figure 2.3.1 VC instrument aim, type and size 
Policy instrument Aim of instrument Type of instrument Capital availability 
(EUR) 
Environmental 
Technology Scheme, 
Norway 
Promote Norwegian 
cleantech in national and 
international markets.  
Grant scheme 32 million per annum 
The Carbon Trust 
Fund, UK 
To accelerate the 
commercialization of 
clean energy 
Fund 55 million 
High-Tech 
Gründerfonds, 
Germany 
Support the seed market 
through a wide number 
of investments 
Fund 301.5 + 272 million 
Vigo Accelerator To stimulate the Finnish 
seed market while 
creating new private seed-
funds. 
Organisational - Fund Unknown 
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Figure 2.3.2 VC instrument eligibility criteria and investment types 
Policy instrument Eligible ventures Type of investments 
Environmental 
Technology Scheme, 
Norway 
SME‟s and large 
enterprises that are 
initiating demonstration 
projects 
Grants; provided that the project can be fully financed 
with the help of private VC. 
The Carbon Trust Fund, 
UK 
UK based ventures in the 
energy efficiency sector 
50% matchfunding (co-funding). Both seed and later 
stage VC. Equity and quasi-equity. 
High-Tech 
Gründerfonds, 
Germany 
Primarily German 
ventures operating for 
less than 1 year.  
EUR 500K initial seed investments + follow-up 
investments and some later-stage VC. Could exceed 
EUR 2.5 million. . Equity and quasi-equity. 
Vigo Accelerator Ventures younger than 8 
years in a wide cleantech 
perspective 
The program pays for management consulting, and the 
Accelerators invest in venure equity. 
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4 Interviews  
List of interviewees: 
Interviewee 1 (I-1) – Program grant officer at Innovation Norway, Norway.  
Interviewee 2 (I-2) – Project Manager at Cleantech Scandinavia 
Interviewee 3 (I-3) – Long-time public and private cleantech consultant and co-owner of 
Heather Energy, UK. 
Interviewee 4 (I-4) – Communications Manager at High-Tech Gründerfonds, Germany. 
Interviewee 5 (I-5) – Partner at 350 Investment Partners, UK.  
Interviewee 6 (I-6) – Head of the Vigo Accelerator Programme, Finland. 
4.1 Perspectives on the main obstacles of cleantech VC funding 
 
As one of the initial questions in the interview, the author asked I-1 what he regarded to be 
the main challenge(s) of cleantech venture companies (from now on referred to as ventures) 
now, and if possible, in the future.  I-1, from his experience with grant funding in Innovation 
Norway, thought that one of the biggest problems is that many start-up cleantech 
companies have problems finding the capital they need to actually go through with 
their project. The reason for this, he explains, is that the Norwegian oil and gas market is 
very lucrative, offering better opportunities to invest in. Further he explains that this has 
been enhanced by the financial turmoil, causing people in general to take fewer risks and 
sticking to what they know works. This view was also shared by I-5, saying that one of the 
main problems facing cleantech ventures is the lack of funding availabilies. He explains 
that challenges from the past are still hanging on, causing the general private investment 
willingness in the early-stage cleantech sector to lag. Those challenges are related to previous 
venture capital investments in the cleantech sector that were not very successful; the exits did 
not come through, the stock market closed, a lot of people lost money, and as a result both 
specialists and normal VC investors moved into later-stage, lower risk funding. 
(Interview 5)  
Another challenging aspect pointed out by I-4 is the long-time-to-market syndrome that 
characterizes the cleantech venture segment. He also points out that in the context of 
Germany; the cleantech seed market is weak (Interview 1), something that can be seen as a 
confirmation of what has been previously noted by both I-5 and 1. Even Interviewe 6 
confirms that the major problem is the long lead time of the cleantech segment. Further, I-3 
indirectly confirms the problem with lacking venture capital by stating that a high degree of 
policy uncertainty, especially in the UK, has had an offsetting effect on private investors. I-2 
notes how cleantech venture capital funds have lacked profitable retuns, and that this should 
be considered to be a big problem. Just like I-5, I-2 also argues that the financial crisis and 
lacking results created a general uncertainty in the market, causing fund managers to have 
problems raising their funds. Further she notes, just like I-3, that inconsistent policy 
measures caused investors to lose money, hence there is, not distrust in policies, but a 
disregarding of public policy as an investment incentive. Also I-6 mentions that the 
changing public policies in Finland have made the investment environment 
unpredictable, which in hand has a negative effect on the cleantech ventures. I-2 says 
38 
that most investors generally do not like products that are dependent on governmental 
support in the first place. (Interview 2) I-3 also believes that there is a lack of long term 
funding, caused by inconsistency in funding and capital availability, especially in the 
European venture capital model where investments are made in small slices and 
inconsistently. The next category looks into how to solve one of the major obstacles 
mentioned, namely how to access the necessary private capital. 
4.2 Views on the availability of private capital 
The availability of private capital in the cleantech venture capital market is a much debated 
subject. The identified funding gap in the cleantech venture chain indicates that there is lack 
of private VC going into the sector. The funding gap can however not be seen as an 
indication of lacking availability of VC. It is suggested by an Ernst&Young European VC 
trends report that tighter regulations in the area of financial services, such as capital lending 
terms, is playing and will play a key role when it comes to the availability of VC capital in 
general (E&Y 2012). However, some of the interviewees did indicate that private VC is 
absolutely accessible, but in different ways than before. First of all, I-4 from the HTGF 
noted that all private VC coming into their top-managed fund was provided by large 
corporations and not investment companies. Business angels and private investors were 
on the other hand invited to co-invest alongside with the HTGF. (Interview 1) Secondly, I-5 
pointed to the fact that corporations (though not necessarily UK based) and business angels 
are investing more into VC now than before as a result of tax exemtion regulations, to 
mention one reason. He further claimed that there seems to have been a shift in the focus 
of private venture capital investment companies; going from early-stage VC to later-
stage operational investments. This is in particular true for the cleantech segment, and less 
true for segments thought to be very quick and profitable, like ICT, apps etc. I-5 also 
indicates that this is a current trend, saying that: “There is a tendency that some of the 
venture funds are either folded or turned into later stage funds”.   
Addtitionally, I-5 replies followingly when asked whether he feels that investment 
oportunities and the seed of companies is good enough: “Yes, there are for us, because there 
are not really anyone else doing early-stage investments besides a few corporates and 
business angels…I think that the problem at the moment is, you know… R&D has carried 
on in the universities and there are incubator programmes that try to commercialize them, 
and then there is early-stage venture. At least in the UK you need to have all the players in 
there to make it work, and at the moment in the UK the R&D has tariff oportunities to some 
extent, but the whole venture bridge is under pressure. So, if the R&D doesn‟t get 
commercialized it tends to disappear quite quickly; the patents don‟t get updated or paid 
annually, relapse, and then suddenly 10 years or university research becomes very difficult to 
commercialize because there are no patents. So I think that if you get 2-3 years of very low 
venture capital support, the whole machine stops”.  
I-2 paints a bit of a different picture of the situation. She notes that there is a big lack of 
private capital and private investors in particular. This should however be seen in the context 
of Scadinavia. I-2 claims that getting a hold of investors willing to invest in somewhat 
significant cleantech projects or companies (EUR 5 million+) are not easily found, and 
especially not in Scandinavia. On the other hand I-2 notes that foreign private VC can be 
made accessible through co-investments, but this requires that there are domestic investors 
as well. She explains: “…if you are a French investor you would not like to invest alone in 
Sweden. So if you have a fund, governmental or not, it does not matter, they you can team 
up and co-invest, which make it easier to get access to capital”.  
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4.3 Views on attracting private capital 
Attracting private capital can be seen as essential in order to lower the public capital tie-up 
and risk taking. Pointed out to be of high importance by the interviewees, access to private 
capital, wherever in the cleantech VC chain it may be needed, is a multifaced issue. The 
respondents had mixed experiences and opinions on this subject, as (the author assumes) 
they come from different areas of the venture capital chain, dealing with both grant funding 
and venture capital funds. I-2 gave some interesting input when asked about the viability of 
attracting private VC funding, making it clear that it is not a question of attracting private 
VC, but how to find private VC to attract. She makes an example of the Swedish Energy 
Agency which matches the investments of private investors without taking a stake in the 
company. This, according to her is very, very attractive to private investors as it is considered 
to be easy money. The investor gets double the money and a severe risk discount. The 
problem, she says, is that there are way too few private investors, and if she would look for 
an investor right now for any significant amount over EUR 5 million, she would look abroad. 
Further, co-investments are according to I-2 more common than single investments as many 
investors team up to cooperate. (Interview 2) However, this example is from the current 
practice of the Swedish Energy Agency, which is a type of soft loan granted to the investing 
parties. On the complete other side, I-3 argues that it is very hard to attract private capital 
in isolation. He suggests that attracting private VC becomes much easier and more 
beneficial when there is a systematic set of interventions in place, such as different types of 
funds, soft loans, grants, etc. Additionally, I-3 points out that you should never 
underestimate the sophistication of private investors as they take a very rounded, overall 
view and invest in whatever fits their judgement. Hence, he proposes, that stand-alone 
initiatives that are not very well integrated tend to less interesting. As an example, Paul tells a 
story about when he was asking energy investors why they were not investing in the UK 
market. The answer he got was: “Because we did invest in UK power maket in the 1990‟s, 
and the government screwed us”. This is, according to him, a fundamental reason why stand-
alone support policies are doubted by private VC investors, and shows that previous bad, or 
good, experiences stick with investors for a while. 
In the HTGF, giving industries insights to the high-tech venture market is being used as a 
method to attract private capital according to I-4. He further makes it a point than not one 
of the private industry investors has economic profits as the main reason for investing 
in the HTGF.  The minimum investment an industry can make into the fund is EUR 2.5 
million, something that is a minuscule sum compared to the total find size of EUR 272 and 
301.5 million. (I-4) As I-2 points out, having some knowledge on the HTGF herself, the 
German government basically let‟s the industry participate on soft terms, and the rationale 
for the industry to do so is to get access to the cleantech venture deal flow (Interview 2). I-5 
is partly agreeing with I-2, claiming that is is possible to attract private capital and get 
matching private capital. However, he makes a clear distinction between the types of options 
he believes can be attractive to private investors: You can get your private capital 
matching if you do it on an investment-to-investment basis. This way you can match 
the investment focus of your private investor to the selected cleantech venture company. 
There is little chance that an industrial company interested in lighting solutions would be ok 
with investing in wind turbine technology, he says. I-5 further explains how he sees it as 
unlikely that private investors would pay a lump sum of money into a top-level managed 
fund with a diversified portfolio, and trust a governmental body to manage it. (Interview 5)  
This is also somewhat of a statement in line with what both Interviwee 2 and 4 argued; that 
industry in particular want to see and invest in technology that matches their business focus. 
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Also, I-5 argue that by leading the transactions; performing due diligence, screening 
companies, finding the right company, and matching the venture company with the right 
investor; the management team removes an important boundary for private capital, namely 
the risk of picking something early. This risk removal is regarded to be valuable in attracting 
private VC   
I-3 also noted that many cleaner technologies are not compatible with the timescale and 
returns of current privat venture capital companies, saying that “They think in terms of a 10 
year closed fund, a 20% return target and so on. You will never get that (in cleantech).The 
same view is shared by I-5, claiming that “Everyone is waiting for that EUR 10-15 million 
revenue type of deal” 
Finally, both I-2 and 5 mentioned that they had to look abroad when seeking private VC, but 
that national and regional fund were to some degree available.  
4.4 Organizational capabilities 
Acknowleding the complexity of the cleantech venture capital market, organizational 
capabilities becomes an important factor in determining how well public VC is managed. 
Starting off with a somewhat funny observation; while discussing the seemingly good success 
of the HTGF in raising two big VC funds while at the same time including large 
multinational industrial corporations in both human -and monetary capital terms, I-2 
expressed her excitement with the HTGF and jokingly stated: “We should just copy what the 
Germans do…I‟m joking of course…Or not really”. On the other side however, 
communications manager of the HTGF, I-4, made it an important point that “From our 
point of view, it is not enough to just copy a model of a fund and think that it will 
work”. (Interview 2 and 1) Though it is portrayed by the author as a humoristic coincidence, 
it clearly underlines the potential danger of a simplistic policy approach when addressing 
complex issues.  
When asked about his impression of the governmental goals and targets concerning 
cleantech venture funding, I-3 replied that in his view, the government should become 
clearer about what they want to achieve with their funding. Following this statement he 
argued that since there is no traditional industrial policy in the UK, being clear and consistent 
from the governmental side is a hard thing to do, and that in general, it is hard to give the 
public bodies governing public VC the time and independency to do what they need 
to do. Adressing the time perspective, I-3 points out how it took the Carbon Trust 3-4 years 
to build the organization, and when they started doing interventions (various types of 
support strategies, like the Caron Trust Fund) it took them another 4-5 years to become 
really good at what they were doing. He explains that it takes time for such organizations 
to find their place in the market, and actually figuring out where they can add value. 
Many institutional bodies, including the Carbon Trust, he says, become victims for turning 
tides in politics. Therefore, because it takes a long time to build institutional capabilities, the 
mandate for any such organization should be very clear and it should be established 
at the highest possible level. 
According to I-5, good organizational capabilities are essential for being successful with 
public cleantech venture funding. He points out good networks as one of the main factors 
in building capacity. In terms of the Carbon Trust fund, managed by 350IP, the 350IP 
fund managers have benefitted greatly from the networks of the Carbon Trust, giving them 
access to big technological -and marketing teams. I-5 mentions the challenges facing a 3-4 
man management team; various new technology proposals coming in regularly, each of them 
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maybe in a different market segment. Hence these things take a lot of time and it limits your 
ability to actually do the good stuff. What makes 350IP succeed in Inteviewee 5‟s opinion is 
that they do have the external capacity to quickly review proposal and perform an initial 
due diligence screening.  
I-2 also mentions the fact that within the Nordic public grant systems there are very few 
professionals; meaning that there might be industrial experience, but not what is thought to 
be needed, namely entrepreneurial and investment experience. She explains: “I‟m not 
saying that the people who work there (public grant systems) are are useless by any means, 
but serial entrepreneurs or investors that have tried, failed, invested, developed, and 
exited; they know some things that other’s don’t” (Interview 2) 
Additionally, I-4 claims that the big corporations bring along networks and expertice 
that the venture companies and the fund management greatly benefit from. In the 
HTGF, industry is represented at board level and elict some influence over management 
decisions.  
4.5 Evaluating public VC success 
This section should not be understood as how overall VC success, profitability or efficiency 
is measured, but rather as indications of how public VC initiatives are evaluated. The 
efficiency of a cleantech venture capital grant scheme, or the profitability and efficiency of a 
public VC fund is often being used as a measure of the success of the policy instrument. 
While acknowledging the fundamental differences between a grant scheme and a venture 
fund, the author recognizes differences in what public capital administrators choose to define 
as success.  
Starting with the Environmental Technology Scheme in Norway, according to I-1 it has since 
its start-up in 2010 initiated total investments in the cleantech segment of approximately 
EUR 320 million. Considering that the annual budget of the scheme is EUR 32 million, the 
private capital make up (320-112) EUR 208 million. This constitutes a private/public ratio of 
about 1 to 3. The Carbon Trust fund on the other hand has invested EUR 50 million and 
raised EUR 222 million, giving a private/public ratio of 1 to 4.5. In case of the German High 
Tech Gruünderfonds (second one) the ratio is 1 to 2.7. So, if trying to determine the success 
of attracting private capital, the ratios can tell that the UK Carbon Trust fund is most 
successful in having the largest share of private VC compared to the public investment. 
However, the ratios cannot be compared as all three VC policy instruments regard success to 
be different. First of all, the Norwegian Environmental Technology Scheme measures their 
success in initiated project costs. The UK Caron Trust fund uses both investment 
profitability and attracted private VC ratio as measures of success. Thirdly, the German 
Gründerfonds, according to I-4, seems to use the number of venture companies helped 
and funded as a measurement of success in addition to longer term overall fund 
profitability. (Interview 1,3 and 4) 
4.5.1 Profitability 
Assuming that profitability can only be measured and considered if the policy tool in itself is 
set up on a commercial basis, the two cases suitable for such consideration is the UK Carbon 
Trust fund and the German High-Tech Gründerfonds. However, because cleantech venture 
capital funds often are long-term investments, the profitability is hard to measure or say 
something about. According to I-5, the Carbon Trust fund is currently profitable. Having 5 
exits to show for so far, all of them being profitable, the Carbon Trust has a 10 to 1 beverage 
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despite having had to write off 4 companies. However, I-5 points out an interesting thing, 
clearly indicating that easy profit is not the only thing that matters when public capital is used 
for venture funding of cleantech: “It’s a tough area, and if you want easy investments 
it’s probably not for you”. I-4, communications manager of HTGF, claimed that it was too 
early and to hard to say anything about the profitability of the two funds they have under 
management. However, it was the author’s impression that profit was secondary 
compared to fulfilling the overall goal of supporting the seed market through venture capital 
investments. This impression was strengthened by I-4‟s claim that “…none of our 
corporate investors have profit as the number one incentive for investing. Sure, they 
want their money back, but if they don’t get all of it, that’s ok for them” 
4.5.2 Efficiency 
To measure the efficiency of a single policy instrument can be a tough thing to do. Most 
policy tools are part of larger policy packages that together aim to deliver the desirable 
results. On the other hand, knowing the effect of single policies is important, allowing for 
adjustments or refinements that futher increase efficiency. In terms of public venture capital, 
efficiency can be defined differently depending on the goal of the policy tool. As implied by 
I-1 from Innvovation Norway, the efficiency of the Environmental Technology Programe 
can be defined as the additionality of the grants given to the venture companies and the 
initiated project costs that is covered by private capital. In the Carbon Trust fund, 
efficiency includes profitability of the fund and the share of raised private capital in co-
funding; the latter one being the indicator of how good of a catalyst for attracting private 
capital the fund is. Though measures of efficiency are vague in the commercially profit-
driven funds, it is till possible to interpret that they define it as a mix of profitability and level 
of achievement in terms of doing what they were meant to do from the public point of view; 
i.e. supporting the seed market while attracting private VC (HTGF), or having the main 
focus on attracting private VC through leading the due diligence screening and seeking 
private investors that might potentially end up buying the cleantech venture invested in. I-6, 
representing the Vigo Accelerator programme, claimed that they look at the rate of which 
the Accelerators are able to generate value for the portfolio companies and 
furthermore raise external private VC on their behalf.  
4.6 Legal considerations 
Public venture capital, in the form of both public funds and public grant schemes, are under 
regulation by national and international law. Assuming that laws and regulations affect the 
natural maneuverability of venture funding policy instruments, it becomes relevant to find 
out what those limitations are and how they could affect the effectiveness of a given policy. 
The author asked I-1 representing Innovation Norway if he felt that the current regulations 
in relation to the Environmental Technology Scheme was limiting in any way, and also what 
he would like to do that he cannot currently do because of those regulations. The interviewee 
replied that “It is a very hard question to answer…but of course it would be nice to be 
able to give extra grants to the companies that we really, really believe in and 
especially those who have problems attracting private capital”. I-1 further points out 
that the ETS is limited to the funding of projects, and not companies or people.  This means 
that the ETS can fund the same company more than once, but that a given project is limited 
to a given sum of money. I-1 explains the logic behind this in the following manner: “If a 
company gets a grant from us and fails, that does not mean that the same company can‟t 
receive another grant. If the company has an idea that is better than before, we will support 
it. Because then the company and the private investor probably has more and better 
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knowledge on what the product needs, and if it works the second time it might be the 
solution to a big problem” 
From the public venture fund point of view, I-4 at the HTGF points out the investment 
guidelines as one of the regulatory limitations in terms of functioning like a fully free venture 
capital investment company. These guidelines are set by the HTGF board and apply to all 
investments made by the HTGF.  Also, the German government made an indication of the 
funds to the European Commission that lay down some laws that we have to follow as well. 
In particular, I-4 mention the fact that they cannot aquire more than 25% equity in any 
venture as an important limitation, but further note that this limitation exists in order to 
avoid too many publically owned and dominated companies. HTGF is also limited to 
investing in companies that are one year or younger, according to I-4.  
I-3, having multiple work experience in the field, note that in the UK situation, state aid 
clearance can be “…a bit of a pain”. As all schemes above a minimum level require state 
aid clearance, which in I-3 opinion does complicate things as laws and regulations often 
follow. He also points out that some countries do get around the regulations. As an 
example he mentions Germany who provide soft loans for wind power with rates as low as 
4-5%, something that is way below commercial rates for large scale projects. This can be seen 
in contrast to state aid regulations which say that “You have to invest on a commercial 
basis”. Jokingly, I-3 adds that he has no idea how they get around the regulations, but that it 
seems to be possible to do so with a bit of creativity. ”Either that or they simply don’t 
give a shit” 
Staying in the UK, the Carbon Trust Fund management partner (I-5), note that there are 
some screens in terms of how they can operate with public money. For the Carbon Trust 
Fund however, it is state aid clearance and additionality that influence 350IP’s 
maneuverability the most according to the interviewee. In terms of additionality, the same 
person point out that a major challenge is to balance the encouragement of private capital 
through co-investments and knowing when to say: “This will happen without us”. The 350IP 
is not the only voice in the management of the Carbon Trust Fund, and there has been 
occations where the Carbon Trust Company has put down the line and discouraged co-
investment. This is not because the deal has been bad, but because public money is simply 
not needed, according to I-5. Futhermore, the Carbon Trust Fund comply with one of the 
major provisions of state aid, namely that capital should be invested on a commercial basis, 
by having at least 50% private capital in every deal.  
I-6 did not see any legal issues or considerations, especially since the VAP does not 
constitute state aid and operates on a free market. She also noted that the VAP had full 
declarance from the EU Commission and that there were no legal obstacles in their 
operations. 
4.7 Additionality and public VC instruments 
Additionality, from the public point of view, can be interpreted as a measure of efficiency in 
public spending. It was mentioned as one of the major considerations by the representatives 
from both the Carbon Trust Fund and the Environmental Technology Fund. In the first 
case, I-5 noted that they sometimes have potentially good funding opportunities that they 
have to reconsider because of the additionality perspective. Though the venture might be 
very attractive to invest in, the fund management had to evaluate whether, in the interviewees 
(5) words: 
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 “…they will make it without us”.  
This indicates that there are ventures that might not need additional public funding, 
something that is also noted by I-2: 
“If the business is good enough, there will always be people interested”  
Another perspective on additionality and public VC instruments is the way additionality is 
measured. The Environmental Technology Scheme measures additionality in initiated private 
investments. In the Norwegian situation, companies need to have a pirvate investor in order to 
secure a grant through the scheme. I-1 noted that they had initiated total project investments 
of EUR 330K whereof EUR 76K came from the public grant scheme.  
In the case of Carbon Trust and HTGF, the author got the impression that additionality was 
measured in two ways: (1) The actual leverage ratio on investments, meaning that if the 
Carbon Trust Fund would symetrically co-fund a venture with two other industrial investors, 
their contribution would be 33.33% and the private capital contribution would be 66.66%, 
hence the leverage ratio would be 1 to 2. I-5 claimed that their normal investment was a 
symmetrical 50/50 investment, meaning a leverage ratio of 1 to 1.  
For the Vigo Accelerator Programme, additionality in terms of financial leverage on private 
capital seemed to be less of an issue. I-6 noted that the Vigo Portfolio companies 
(accumulated ventures acquired by all Accelerator companies) had raised approximately EUR 
130 million since the start-up of the programme in 2009. Though the VAP is an 
organizational entity with no real capital budget, it is aimed at direct VC investments and 
does not operate freely from public finances as seen in the description of the programme 
previously in this study. However, I-1 saw the potential for additionality in VC stages where 
the funding gap was present and further noted that the VAP is designed to have 
temporary public involvement. The same I-also made it clear that the additionality of the 
VAP should be seen in the light of transitioning financial coverage of the funding 
gaps from public to private. 
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5 Analysis 
The analysis section of this study will look at the findings and the relationships between the 
different findings and compare them to the five OECD criterial for governmental funding of 
technology based companies. Since these criteria propose what the public policy for VC 
should take into consideration, the rationale behind the analysis is to emerge with best 
practice suggestions on how public VC policy should consider the criteria of the OECD 
framework. The cases and the interview findings are used in a complementart manner in 
order to analyse how governmental VC instruments should be set up, and what issues and 
problems they might encounter.  
5.1 Designing the policy instrument 
The configuration of schemes must consider the nature and extent of the investment 
incentives, whether they are aimed at venture capital firms or directly at small firms, 
stages of investment to be targeted, risk factors and the leveraging effects on private 
capital. 
5.1.1 Leveraging and attracting private VC through instrument design 
Venture capital is synonymous with risk. There are multiple risk factors present in the 
cleantech venture capital chain, making this VC segment particularly difficult to invest in. It 
was noted by some of the interviewees that the reason why private VC is hard to attain for 
the cleantech sector is because of specifically high risk, often seen in relation to the long-
time-to-market syndrome, unproven technology, insecure markets etc. (I-3,4 and 5). In order 
to close the alledged risk gap, the policy instruments under study in this paper are all 
designed to some degree to minimize investment risks for private investors. The 
Environmental Technology Scheme supports cleantech demonstration projects with 25-45% 
of the total costs if it can be assumed that private capital can cover the rest (I-1). This can be 
seen as a risk deduction for the private investors as they, simply put, get money for investing 
money. On the other hand, the author interpreted that the ETS require that the cleantech 
ventures to have access to private capital before getting the grant. Private VC will have to 
cover minimum 55% (small enterprises), and be sufficient for covering the project in its 
entirety. This means that the risk bound to carrying out due diligence of ventures rests with 
the private investors. A funding instrument doing the complete opposite is the Carbon Trust 
Fund. The fund will carry out due diligence screenings and match the attractive ventures with 
interested investors. By doing this the fund acts as more of a catalyst for attracting private 
VC earlier than it would normally come in, and will hence have a positive effect on reducing 
investor risk. A fundamental difference is however that the Carbon Trust Fund does not 
provide „free money‟ like the ETS, but they will share the main investment risk at a lower 
level. The author does acknowledge the different stages that the instruments operate in, but 
note that both are trying to promote investments in hard-to-fund stages of the venture chain 
as proposed by the funding-gap model, namely very early-stage and demonstration.  
The odd case out in this context is the HTGF. In this case, risk deductive measures for 
private VC is linked to the terms of which private capital can participate in the top-level 
managed fund. The minimum limit of investment is set at EUR 2.5 million, something that 
one interviewee claimed to be „soft terms‟ for access to the deal flow. When part of the fund, 
the industrial investors participate at the board level of management, giving them influence 
over the portfolio. The author interprets that this is a risk reducing incentive for private VC, 
as they are given broad access to the potential investment ventures; hence they can limit their 
own efforts in due diligence screening. It should also be considered that the broad seed-
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funding focus of the fund, in time, will have a leveraging effect on private capital even 
though these results are not yet available.  
Again, I-5 noted that it is much easier to get private VC matching if the instrument is 
designed to be on an investment-by-investment basis. The same interviewee argues that it is 
very hard to get private VC, and especially industrial VC, to invest in a top-level managed 
fund that has a wide range of cleantech companies in its portfolio. This statement is also 
somewhat supported by the statement of I-4, claiming that the industrial investors of the 
HTGF value closeness to their sectoral seed-market and the deal flow as more important 
than profits. The fundamental design difference of the HTGF and the Carbon Trust Fund is 
that of a top-level fund and an investment-by-investment fund. The first one can be 
interpreted to be a good approach when there is a broad base of portfolio companies within 
the cleantech segment, giving the industrial investors multiple venturing inputs and ideas as a 
result of exposure to the deal flow. However, if the fund is structured to have a smaller and 
narrower portfolio, this value is not present and it makes more sense to match the venture 
and the industrial investor on an investment-to-investment basis. 
The VAP is designed to attract the best VC companies to become Accelerators through 
giving their chosen portfolio companies streamlined access to public capital and exposure to 
the best ventures in Finland. The additionality perspective of using public capital is discussed 
more thoroughly in the additionality section of the analysis, but the author wishes to 
highlight a statement given by I-2 in regards to this section: 
“There is, not distrust in policies, but a disregarding of public policy as an investment 
incentive” 
According to this statement, the VAP approach to attracting private VC is not in line with 
the preferences of private investors. Assuming that the ventures have, and in the future will 
have access to public capital, there will be no real decoupling of cleantech venture capital and 
their reliability of public support.  
5.1.2 Proportionality of instrument design 
 
Something that becomes an evident issue when looking at the different risk-reducing 
approaches for attracting private VC is whether the design measures taken from the public 
side are proportionate to the costs of risk from the private side. In other words, are the 
policy instruments cost efficient? There were quite a few interesting comments and 
statements in terms of how a cleantech VC policy instruments should be constructed to 
attract private VC. I-2 noted that:  
“It is not a question about attracting private VC, but finding private VC to attract”  
This claim indicates that private VC in general is not hard to attract, especially in the cases 
where governments match investments with grants or soft loans, as noted by I-2. A similar 
indication is made by I-1, noting that the ETS spent 75% of their annual budget within the 
first 6 months. On the other hand, both I-3 and 5 claimed that getting private capital into the 
early cleantech segment is very hard to do. The author notes that I-2 was addressing grant 
schemes in particular, and that I-1 also works with grant funding. The author would argue 
that since private VC has declined on a general level in Europe (E&Y 2012) and that it has 
been claimed to be hard to find private VC for the cleantech sector, the grant schemes, such 
as the ETS, might indicatively not be cost efficient. One could state that this size of risk 
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reduction is necessary in order to attract private VC, but a counter argument is provided by 
I-5: 
“…we would argue that you can still get your private sector matching…it‟s much easier to do 
that on an investment-to-investment basis; sort of what we have done. That is how we 
managed to get our 10-1 beverage.”  
First of all, the basic difference between the grant scheme and the fund in this case is that the 
ETS „gives money away‟, while the Carbon Trust Fund still holds a nominal share of 
whatever project of venture it invests in. This would indicate, considering the statement 
above, that the extent of risk reducing investment measures of the ETS is not proportionate 
to the current costs of risk for private investors, but rather higher.  
I-5 mentioned a very interesting capability of the fund management well worth noticing: 
“…we‟ve been lucky enough to have the relationship with the Carbon Trust (company), 
which has meant that we‟ve had access to large technological teams and marketing teams, 
and we can very quickly review proposals and say if a business is interesting or not. If you are 
just a 3-4 man team…it can take quite a long time to get through things”  
In relation to the previous section, this statement indicates that the risk carried by managers 
of public capital can be absorbed by having skilled networks. Especially, this can be thought 
to be valid for the due diligence stage of very early investments. If the managers of public 
funds can manage the added risk of due diligence better than the single industrial investor, or 
the single business angel, it can be assumed that public due diligence screening is beneficial. 
The single investor gets a risk rebate, and the public cost of managing the risk is lower than 
the investors cost of the same; hence it can be interpreted as a cost efficient public incentive.  
5.1.3 Policy instrument target stage - the cleantech venture capital 
bridge and private VC trends 
Should public funding for cleantech target more R&D or should later stages, like 
demonstration and commercialization be the main objective for public VC? This question is 
indicative of uncertainty whether more money for R&D will generate the desirable ventures 
needed to attract private VC, or if public support should be aimed at later stages, like 
commercialization and demonstration. (Private Comunication, 2013)  
 An explanation of why there is an equity gap in the UK was provided by I-5: 
“R&D has carried on in the universities and there are incubator programmes that try to 
commercialize them, and then there is early-stage venture. At least in the UK you need to 
have all the players in there to make it work, and at the moment in the UK the R&D has 
tariff oportunities to some extent, but the whole venture bridge is under pressure. So, if the 
R&D doesn‟t get commercialized it tends to disappear quite quickly; the patents don‟t get 
updated or paid annually, relapse, and then suddenly 10 years or university research becomes 
very difficult to commercialize because there are no patents. So I think that if you get 2-3 
years of very low venture capital support, the whole machine stops” 
This statement indicates that the target of public policy should not be limited to one specific 
stage. Further, the same interviewee claimed that the investment opportunities for the 
Carbon Trust Fund was very good since they were basically alone doing early-stage VC, 
which is an implication that, in the UK context, there is a lack of private early-stage VC. 
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Additionally, according to Demirel & Paris (2010), early-stage VC is very much linked to 
patents, and hence the author interprets that because of the patents‟ vulnerability to low VC 
support as projected by I-5, further public R&D funding in such context could increase the 
inefficiency in public spending.  
The findings also indicated that understanding of the current venture capital market is crucial 
when it comes to public policy instrument design. First of all, I-5 pointed out that general 
private VC has fled the early-stage cleantech market in the UK. 
“…the generalist investors who came into cleantech 3 or 4 years ago took the wrong deals, 
lost a lot of money, and then disapeared rather quickly. The specialist venture funds and the 
larger funds came under a lot of pressure, having problems raising the next fund, and then 
went for lower risk, later-stage funding” 
I-3 also made a similar note when he claimed that the investors he talked to did not want to 
invest in the UK clean energy market because they had lost lots of money there due to failing 
governmental policy support. Both statements indicate that there is distrust in the cleantech 
VC market, but not necessarily that cleantech is bad business. Further, I-5 claimed that there 
is a shift in the provision of private capital; going from VC investment companies to industry 
and business angels. This is supported by the HTGF case where all private VC in the fund is 
industrial. Also, I-4 note that these investors are looking for the actual dealflow withing their 
sector rather than the potential profit, implying that their investments are somewhat linked 
to, for them, interesting products. In addition, I-1 mentions that, because of the current 
financial turmoil, investors stick to what they know. 
The author interprets this as a shift to private VC that also carries market knowledge; hence 
they will have reduced market distrust. The implication is that the design of new financial 
policy instruments should acknowledge this shift and target „knowlegeable private VC‟. 
Further, from the findings of this study it can be said that any claim of sufficient risk capital 
availability in the cleantech market should be seen in relationship to current private VC 
trends. The idea of what is an attractive venture company has shifted, as noted by I-5 and 3, 
implying that cleantech ventures are potentially profitable, but simply not as profitable as 
ICT, apps and other quick-and-big return investments, hence they will not attract the same 
amount of external private VC. This can be supported by a statement from I-3 claiming that 
the private VC investors will take a well-rounded view on the market and invest in whatever 
they see as attractive. This inducate that private VC investment logic is to invest wherever 
chances of return are best, and not to limit investments to a specific sector or stage. As I-5 
noted, even sector-bound cleantech investors have moved to later stage investments because 
they are more attractive, hence it cannot be assumed that these investors will stay in early-
stage cleantech when the general product market changes.  
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5.2 Additionality of the policy instrument 
Venture capital programmes should seek to stimulate private sector funding and 
create a commercially viable market, which would allow government schemes to be 
phased out as private sources of capital expand 
I-6, representing the Vigo Accelerator Programme, claimed that additionality of the 
programme should be seen in light of the defined equity gaps in the Finnish venture chain, 
and that the programme has managed to raise EUR 130 million in VC accumulated among 
all portfolio companies. Further, there was no indication of considering the actual 
additionality in terms of leverage on private capital for the program. However, as the 
program has an organizational approach, financial leverage ratios might be thought to be 
unnecessary. On the other hand, this particular instrument does not operate free from all 
public capital, but is designed to streamline the access of public funds for the ventures. From 
the VAP case study it became clear that only 60% of the raised finances came from private 
capital, exemplifying what the study by Friends of the Earth claimed, that ratios are often 
double-counted (Friends for the Earth, 2013) This makes an interesting case for quite a few 
reasons. First of all, one of the goals of the VAP is to make the early-stage VC market self-
sustained. When considering that 40% (more if exits are not counted) of the capital comes 
from the public and that the main motivations for VC companies, or Accelerators, was to get 
access to this capital through „preferred treatment‟ and indirect consultant write-offs, it can 
be questioned what remains in terms of motivation if the public support-capital is removed. 
Further, if the public support-capital is not removed it can be argued that the program has 
not achieved its goal in shifting the coverage of the equity gap from public to private capital, 
but merely made it easier to cover.  
I-5 claimed that there were occations where the Carbon Trust Fund had to recede from 
investing in a venture, not because the deal was bad, but because they were not needed from 
a financial point of view. Other statements, such as I-2 noting that if the venture company is 
good enough, there will be interested private capital, inducate that additionality, per 
definition, can be a limiting factor to for-profit VC funds. 
Another aspect in terms of additionality, which goes for both the VAP and the ETS, is 
whether public VC grants are truly additional. First of all, the ETS does require the applying 
venture to have a private investor prior to receiving the grant. Considering that Lidgren & 
Dalhammar (2013) found, in the Finnish context, that receiving a public grant has become a 
prerequisite in order to get future private VC, it should be questioned if the grants actually 
make themselves additional. It cannot be excluded that this so-called „minimum threshold‟ 
for venture companies has increased the level of additionality of the grants; and the author of 
this study would assume that it most probably has. Logically, if there were no public grants, 
there would be no prerequisite for venture firms to access them. The same can be claimed to 
be the case for the VAP, as it is structured and founded upon access to public grants. The 
UK guidance document on additionality suggests that any form of non-additionality should 
be designed out (UK GOV Additionality Guide, 2008). Though this might be correct, the 
findings imply that additionality can be artificially created by public funding instruments, 
hence it should be considered whether the designed additionality is actually really additional. 
Mazzucato (2011) suggests that governments also create new problems in the market when 
not being careful about the intervention; something that can be supported again by Lerner 
(2009 and 2004), claiming that overshooting public capital into the market can create 
significant public spending inefficiencies. Hence, this might be a case of just that.  
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Further, something that came up during the interviews was at what stage, and in what size 
range public VC should be injected, regardsless of method for injecting it. First of all, I-2 
pointed out that:  
“There is a lack of understanding from the governmental side in terms of what VC for 
cleantech is needed for.” 
 The same interviewee also claimed that the current VC provided by government in Sweden 
is marginal in terms of per-investment size and that it does not cover the actual need of the 
sector. In addition, I-1 stated that:  
“It would be nice to be able to give extra money to the ventures that we really, really believe 
in.” 
Both these statements point in the direction that there are untapped and potentially positive 
scources of additionality in the cleantech VC chain that public intervention could address. It 
also indicates that methods of raising the bigger VC amount (in the EUR 5-10 million range 
according to I-2) for the commercializations stage is not supported to the same degree as 
lower sums of investment by the public. However, I-2 also claims that if the company or the 
product is good enough, investors will be interested. This can be seen as somewhat of a 
contradiction, as one could assume that a EUR 5-10 million investment would be attractive 
to private VC if it was a good business idea, hence public VC would not be needed. By this 
logic, additionality suggests big public VC investments in non-attractive (by market 
standards) businesses.  
5.3 Management of the policy instrument 
Successful venture capital programmes are those which elicit private sector 
participation in the design stage and where the private sector plays a professional role 
in the programme’s management. 
5.3.1 Benefits and drawbacks of including the private sector in 
program management 
Both funds of this study (Carbon Trust Fund and HTGF) are managed on a commercial 
basis by private fund management companies. Beyond the private management company, the 
HTFG include industrial representatives at board level, allowing for industrial insights and 
contributions in the fund management. These two statements from the funds 
communications manager provide an indication of the rationale behind the inclusiveness: 
“The main reason why we invite private investors is because we are convinced that we can 
support our portfolio companies through this cooperation with industry” 
And; 
“They (private industry investors) bring a lot of expertize and networks along with them, and 
of course, it is good for the image of our funds” 
Though the industrial investors financial contribution is at a relative marginal level compared 
to the total fund (on average less than 1%), the author interprets that they add network and 
expertize value, something that also, as shown in a previous section of the analysis, has 
monetary value in terms of absorbing risk. From one point of view it can be argued that 
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industrial investors are given access to the HTGF on soft terms, but on the other hand they 
also add value to the fund through expertize and market knowledge.  
Further, another interesting statement, from I-2 and 5, was that they often looked abroad 
when seeking private VC investments. This could indicate that the networks being built 
around public VC funding mechanisms should seek to be international. 
Also, as mentioned previously in the private VC trends section of the analysis, the distrust in 
the cleantech VC market could potentially be reduced by giving investors access and 
relevance in the program management.  
Though there seems to be big benefits from including the private sector in program 
management, a drawback was also mentioned. Both I-2 and 3 notes that the current profit 
incentives for fund managers are not ideal: 
“Since they (fund management companies) make money from the annual management 
commission which is relative to the size of th fund, they are incentivized to raise as big of a 
fund as possible, and not so much as to securing the the development of the portfolio 
companies” (I-2) 
Though this statement indicate that the investment company profit criteria might challenge 
the results of the portfolio companies, there are also plausible positive effects of such a 
incetinve scheme, depending on what the fund is aimed at. It can be argued that in the case 
of the Carbon Trust Fund, with a relatively small portfolio, the above mentioned scheme 
would have negative consequenses for the portfolio companies. However, if the fund has a 
wider portfolio with a focus on seed-funding for the spurring of necessary product 
developments, like the HTGF, an incentive to maximize the fund could be interpreted to be 
positive as it would potentially enable the fund to widen the portfolio and hence, improve 
the performance of the fund according to what it was meant to do. This is however based 
upon an assumption that it takes less managerial efforts to manage seed companies than to 
manage a firm from seed to exit.  
 
5.4 Evaluation of the policy instrument 
A criterion for measuring success is the extent to which venture capital funds or small 
firms are created which can operate on a commercial basis, i.e. generate an attractive 
rate of return.  
There are several ways that success has been defined and measured in the cases of this study. 
First of all, the Environmental Technology Scheme measures success in terms of leveraged 
private capital. Compared to the leverage ratio of i.e. the Carbon Trust (1 to 1) the ETS ratio 
of close to 1 to 4 can be interpreted to be pretty good. However, the major difference is that 
the ETS only looks at the leverage ratio while the Carbon Trust Fund also measures profit 
ratios. As claimed by I-5, the fund has a profit beneficiary of 1 to 10. Further, though not 
directly measured, the fund also created cleantech companies that are currently functioning 
and making a profit on the market. The HTGF, with a focus on very early seed investments, 
is still not at the point where they have been able to exit too many of their portfolio 
companies yet. And as I-4 claims, it is impossible to say anything about the actual 
profitability. The fact that VC funds in general operate over a number of years, it becomes 
hard to evaluate them on the basis of this particular OECD criterion. I-3 states that. 
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“It is hard to give the public bodies governing public VC the time and independency to do 
what they need to do” 
And; 
“It takes time for such organizations to find their place in the market, and actually figuring 
out where they can add value” 
Further, I-5 states that: 
“It‟s a tough area, and if you want easy investments it‟s probably not for you” 
The top two statements indicate that, first of all, premature evaluations VC policy 
instruments run the risk of undervaluing the instrument in question because of the complex 
and time-dependent nature of public programmes. Seccondly, the statements indicate a risk 
related to the independency of these programmes; namely that many of them have ordinated 
governmental guidelines that limit their „free‟ operation. It is indicative that evaluations of, 
especially, public for-profit VC funds should take into consideration the operative 
restrictions that these funds work under. Furthermore, considering the last statement, since 
public VC for cleantech is operating in equity gaps and a sector thought to have a longer 
profit lead time, it is unreasonable for these funds to be benchmarked against private VC 
funds operating freely.  
I-4 however states that they consider the additional benefits they create for the industrial 
investors to be a measure of success since these investors do not prioritize profit in regards 
to their investments. This is an interesting statement, and it clearly advocates that there is no 
set measure of success for VC funds in general, and that success of a fund is related to its 
original goals. The Vigo Accelerator Programme, like the ETS, also measure success in terms 
of leverged private VC. But, in addition, they also consider the ability of the instrument to 
transfer capital coverage of the equity gaps from public to private.  
5.5 Legal maneuverability of the policy instrument 
In terms of legal acting space there are laws and regulations setting certain standards 
for what a government is allowed to do and standards for what governmental 
instruments can do. The creativity and movement of governments and institutions 
within the legal sphere is thought to be important when it comes to designing and 
operating successful policies for direct venture funding of early stage tech firms, and 
for cleantech firms in particular. 
In terms of legal maneuverability the interviewees expressed a number of limitations to their 
operation. First of all I-1, representing the ETS, noted that he would like to be able to give 
extra financial support to those ventures or projects that he, or the evaluation panel of the 
programme really believed in. Further he conveyed that this support would especially be 
good for those projects or companies that struggle to get access to private capital. Based on 
the scheme‟s interpretation of additionality, “Initiating what would otherwise not happen”, 
the author assumes that „extra financial support‟ would have a higher degree of additionality 
than the the projects which have access to private VC. However, it can be argued that there 
is a reason for why those projects do not have private investors, but nevertheless, it cannot 
be excluded that those projects are affected by a scewed VC market where the definitions of 
what is a good investment has changed significantly, as noted by I-3 and 5 earlier. If the 
instrument‟s definition of additionality is used in definite terms, it can be argued that the legal 
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context is limiting maximum additionality. On the other hand, the author does see the 
perspective on the viability for projects being fully realized. Yet, based on a scewed 
investment market, the author questions the reason for why some projects do not find 
private capital.  
I-4 representing the HTGF management registered that the investment guidelines of the 
fund was a limiting factor for them. He noted that the guidelines were set at board level with 
influence from government, the EU Commission, and the private industrial investors. 
Among the limiting factors expressed by I-4 is the fact that the fund cannot invest in more 
than 25% equity in any venture and the venture in question needs to be under the age of 1 
year. However, is should be expressed that I- is representing the for-profit management 
company managing the fund and might be proned to answer in line with management 
preferences. Still, the statements should not be undermined as the HTGF is a for-profit fund 
per definition and the interviewee seeks to achieve just that. On the other hand, the author 
interprets that the guideline limitations of the HTGF are set in order to achieve the original 
goal of the fund, namely to support the broad seed market. Interestingly, the same 
interviewee was very exited to tell about the other benefits of the fund, such as giving 
industry access and insights to cleantech seed companies. If it can be assumed on a general 
basis that the historical profitability of a VC fund is a determinant factor when it comes to 
raising another fund, the author interprets the value-creation of the HTGF as a way of 
overcoming lacking profit potential due to limiting investment guidelines. This indicates that 
investment guidelines that limit potential profitability of a public fund by default can be 
overcome by creating other values for the investors. This should on the other hand be 
considered contextual, as not all countries have industries with venture capital arms, as noted 
by I-2 and 5.  
The Vigo Accelerator Programme is exposed to very few legal limitations as it is not directly 
a financial instrument, but more of a capital-organisational instrument. As I-6 claimed, the 
VAP is declared by the EU Commission and operates freely without significant restrictions. 
The author interprets the VAP to be a hub-like programme, connecting cleantech ventures 
and VC companies which in turn together seek other scoures of private capital while having 
streamlined access to public capital support tools. The functioning of -and the idea behind 
the VAP inducate that VC-connected instruments might not necessarily need to provide the 
capital directly, but rather streamline access to other means of public money.  
I-5 representing the Carbon Trust Fund management company, 350IP, claimed that the 
biggest legal limitations from his perspective were additionality and that all their operation 
had to be on a commercial basis. The additionality perspective, he pointed out, means that 
350IP cannot invest in potentially interesting cleantech ventures if the same venture already 
has sufficient access to other private VC. Again, this is suggesting that additionality does 
restrict the potential profitability of public VC in legal terms. The same interviewee also 
mentioned that they had to invest on a commercial basis and that they achieved this by doing 
50/50 co-investments with other private industrial investors or business angels. Further he 
claimed that, as opposed to top-level managed public funds, it was easier to find investors on 
a 50/50 co-investment basis. This suggests that legal limitations, such as limiting investment 
size and share, do not necessarily affect the successful operation of a public cleantech VC 
fund. It further indicates that finding the right operational approach for the given context is 
essential. 
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6 Discussion 
As noted in the introduction of this study, governments currently hold, indeed, complex and 
important roles in VC funding for cleantech. Additionally, as the cases, findings and analysis 
show, there is no one way of constructing a public VC instrument that helps the further 
development of cleaner technologies. The study uses the OECD criteria for public VC 
funding as a guideline for indicating if there are any best practices or major obstacles with 
public VC instruments in the cleantech sector.  
First of all, the study finds that a best practice standard is very hard to obtain because of a 
large variety in contextual factors. Such factors turned out to be for instance the historical 
context of earlier national investment incentivicing policies and the performance of earlier 
private VC. Two other examples are the industries history of being involved in VC funding, 
which varies across Europe; and finally the different industrial sectors being prevailent in 
various countries. The study does however find that there are varying levels of leverage ratios 
on private capital, different approaches to minimizing investment risks for private investors, 
different ways of including the private sector in the management of the fund, and finally, that 
there are other values than merely profit that is valued in the public VC funds. 
Because of the methodological approach of the study the analysis does not go into the 
deepest details of the abovementioned results. That was on the other hand not the purpose 
of this study. The purpose of the study was to find determinant factors that can influence the 
efficiency of public VC instruments on a wider basis; especially in regards to 
leveraging/attracting private capital, and the potential boundaries connected to legal 
limitations.  
It should also be noted that the OECD framework suggests a model and a set of criteria in 
terms of public venture capital that may not be perfectly aligned with what a government is 
supposed to do. It implies that it is the government‟s job to make sure that private 
companies make money, especially through the „need to be profitable‟. It can be questioned 
whether public money should be spent for governmental or private profit purposes. Do these 
funds really need to be profitable? Also, the framework may not be the best way of 
evaluating how governments best can support the cleantech venture business as other 
interventions, like tax deductions on cleantech investments or for cleantech companies could 
very well be just as effective, if not even better. 
The author found that the different stakeholder interviews presented a good view on the 
current challenges of early-stage cleantech and public VC funding for the sector. Surprisingly, 
even the interviewees in charge of the various public instruments were not reluctant to 
criticize their own operating prerequisites. Though not being strong in nature, the criticism 
was mostly aimed at state aid, related to equity shares, and their possibilities for fulfilling the 
governmental additionality perspective fully. It is noteworthy that fund managers saw 
operating guidelines as limiting, while grant officers made no such remark. The author 
interprets this result to be connected to capital ownership. It could suggest that public capital 
is best spent with private management companies as vehicles for distribution as they have 
more incentives to household capital with larger cririsism. A counterargument to that 
statement is that such management companies would most likely pick the ventures that are as 
close to the best „free market‟ ventures as possible. However, this can be regulated through 
properly set governmental guidelines as displayed in some of the cases in this study. 
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In relation to fund profitability and measurement the author wishes to post the question: Do 
public VC funds need to be profitable? It is of course given that in order to attract external 
private capital there must be something worth while for the investors. However, the case of 
the HTGF and their communications manager, it does not have to be profit. This challenges 
the original view of how venture capital investments work and suggest that industrial interest 
in venturing cleantech companies should be considered to be more than another potential 
source of invest-for-profit capital.  
Further, the author sees the potential for public/industrial co-investments where the 
common goal is to develop the venture to be included into the industrial investors‟ business; 
in other words: public investments should aim for buy-outs. This approach also includes a 
natural market based additionality perspective where risk is shared „pari passu‟ until risk is 
naturally low enough for private capital to carry it alone. The author would argue that as 
opposed to a normal IPO acquirement, the industrial investor gets the chance to form the 
venture to fit the business during development if it is a co-investment leading to a buy-out. 
The author bases this approach upon the analysis regarding investment-by-investment basis 
versus top-managed funds, and the shift in the private VC market.  
The author also found that additionality is a difficult, but yet important factor of public VC 
funding. From the point of view of fund managers it can be seen as a limitation to potential 
profit as they are, per definition, not allowed to invest in the ventures that alsready have 
enough private capital. This is based upon an assumption that those companies are regarded 
as the „cleantech cherries‟ in terms of VC investments. However, it should not be forgotten 
that the role of public support (according to additionality) is not to make a big profit, but to 
supply a gap with the capital they would normally have in the case of a fully functioning 
market. Therefore, the proportionality perspective addressed in the analysis becomes a very 
important issue. Which ventures would, in a perfect market, get access to private VC, and 
how much would they have access to? This question can in the authors‟ opinion help to 
design proportional VC instruments that take into consideration VC stage, type and aid size.  
Though the contextual importance makes it hard to conclude on general terms, the study 
does find that it seems that private capital is easier attracted to public VC funds operating 
from „seed to market‟ when an investment-by-investment approach is used. The case looks to 
be different when there is one set stage for public VC, i.e. seed capital. This suggests that 
designers of public policy instruments for cleantech VC should carefully consider what 
investment incentives private investors are looking for at different stages of the cleantech VC 
chain; and more importantly what incentives they are capable of creating (see organizational 
capabilities).  
When it comes to the actual execution of the study, the author found it difficult to set an 
agenda for what issues should be discussed in the interviews. This was first and foremost 
because there is a lack of studies covering the subject (see Lerner, 2002). Because of this and 
because of a comment provided through private communication, that public policy often lags 
behind the current VC market situation, the author chose to make questions rather open in 
order to get the up-to-date insights. Interestingly, even though questions were open-ended, 
the topics that were addressed by the interviewees were rather consistent. The fact that some 
answers were diverging, the author chooses to attribute to national contextual differences 
and also, in some cases, different professional backgrounds. However, the diverging answers 
turned out to be a good thing as the study then managed to get a wider view on the topic. 
The drawback was on the other hand that results became less generalizable. On a further 
note the author wishes to stress that generalization would not be valid for long in such a 
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quick-moving market. If given the opportunity to conduct a similar study again, the author 
would most likely include people responsible for R&D in Universities and other research 
institutions in order to get their experience with patent funding. This would allow for more 
extensive conslusions on the VC chain equity gaps.  
The author also experienced problems when it came to getting interviewees. The author does 
acknowledge that the number of interviewees is not extensive, but that the cases do 
complement the analysis to make it valid. If done again the author would conduct the study 
outside of national holidays and refine his own pitching technique.  
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7 Conclusions and recommendations 
The study concludes that there is no one way or one best practice to construct a public VC 
instrument that can spur self-sustained investments in the cleantech sector. However, the 
study does find that there are a number of different factors that influence how public VC 
instrument design should be set up, and a number of approaches that are suitable to remedy 
those factors. First of all, the study concludes that in order to attract private capital it is 
necessary to know what kind of private capital the instrument is going to attract. The analysis 
show that the investment incentives for industrial VC and „normal‟ VC companies might 
differ because of different interests. The study also concludes that because there is a shift in 
the VC market where „normal‟ VC has fled the cleantech sector and industrial investors and 
business angels are getting more involved in the same sector, public VC instruments should 
respond to this by not only focusing on for instance fund profit.  
The author recommends that new public venture capital instruments focus on creating 
additional values for industrial investors beyond direct capital investment profits.  
  
The study also concludes that there is little early-stage VC in the cleantech segment and that 
because of this it should be seen as the governments role to incentivize private capital to 
come in earlier than it normally would. Conclusively it is also seen in the study that public 
risk absorbtion plays a key role in this. 
The author suggests that public VC instruments are designed in a fashion that allows for 
public leadership in finding, screening (due diligence), and marching the ventures with 
„knowledgeable VC‟, such as industry.  
 
Another conclusive note is that any public VC instruments should be thoroughly thought 
through in terms of additionality. Additionality is found to play a major role from multiple 
perspectives and can, if not managed correctly, compromise the efficiency of public 
spending.  
The author recommends that any provision of public VC, be grant or fund, should not be 
designed to become a prerequisite for further private venture capital investments. The aim 
should rather be to design for decoupling of private and public VC. 
 
The major importance of having extensive networks is another conclusion of this thesis. It is 
shown that good networks can limit risk, make qualified investments, and connect cleantech 
ventures with suitable private VC.  
The author suggests that any public VC instrument should be constructed to include as many 
stakeholders as possible in order to increase the organizational capabilities of the instrument. 
 
Also, the author suggests that the government should consider taking on a role for increasing 
the interplay between state, industry, cleantech ventures and other private VC companies by 
acting as a network-hub. This could take the shape of cleantech investment seminars or even 
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something simple as a happening, like “Investor-Venture Speed Dating”.  
 
On a more general note the study concludes that early-stage VC for the cleantech segment is 
not completely gone, but that is coming from other sources. Tapping into these sources 
presents one of the major boundaries of public VC instrument design.  
The study also concludes that additionality can pose a limitation to for-profit public VC 
funds as it limits their investments to secondary fuits. However, it is also concluded that 
because of the noted shift in VC, to quicker and bigger profits, governments should not be 
discouraged to believe that these investments are bad, but merely not as good as the best. 
The investment guidelines that come with public VC funds are not designed to prohibit 
profit!  
The author therefore recommends that governments do engage in VC funding for cleantech 
despite being limited by additionality. 
 
The study also indicates that national and supra-national regulations take the form of state-
aid regualtions and additionality perspectives. Conlusively, these should not only be seen as 
negative from the public point of view, as they are present to limit public over-spending and 
new market failures. However, it is also concluded that, because of a lack of understanding 
for what public VC funding is needed for, these regualtions might limit public acting that 
would be proportionate and beneficial for the cleantech venture segment.  
Finally, the last conclusion is that the most plausible way of structuring a public VC fund, 
considering the current VC market and the governmental desire to attract private VC, is to 
have a public portfolio that is matchfunded ona case-to-case basis.  
The author recommends that, unless able to create common non-profit values for all 
investors, public VC funds should be designed to co-invest on a case-to-case basis rather 
than trying to attract private VC into a common portfolio pool 
 
The study did find elements of importance for public VC instrument set-up and also design 
factors related to attracting private capital. Some obstacles and limiting considerations were 
also found. Conclusively the study fulfilled its purpose and aim by answering the research 
questions. 
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